

3.1 Allgemeine Angaben zum Teilprojekt D3

3.1.1 Titel:

Emerging Modes of *Governance* and Climate Protection: Green Companies in Newly Industrializing Countries

3.1.2 Fachgebiete und Arbeitsrichtung:

Internationale Politik, Umweltpolitik, *Governance*, Nichtstaatliche Akteure

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3.2 Zusammenfassung

3.2.1 Kurzfassung

Das Teilprojekt untersucht, inwieweit privatwirtschaftliche Akteure, die sich im *Clean Development Mechanism* (CDM) des Kyoto-Protokolls engagieren, in Räumen begrenzter Staatlichkeit neue Formen von Umweltpolitik und Klimaschutz induzieren. Hierzu analysieren wir (1) die konkreten Bedingungen, unter denen einzelne Firmen zielgerichtete CDM-Partnerschaften mit Internationalen Organisationen, NGOs und Regierungen eingehen; (2) die Auswirkungen der entstehenden *Public Private Partnerships* (PPP) im Hinblick auf neue Formen von *Governance* im Umweltbereich der entsprechenden Länder.

3.2.2 Langfassung

In diesem Teilprojekt untersuchen wir (1) unter welchen Bedingungen sich privatwirtschaftliche Akteure in *Public Private Partnerships* engagieren, aus denen dann konkrete Klimaschutzprojekte in Räumen begrenzter Staatlichkeit hervorgehen und (2) welche Auswirkungen diese Projekte auf die umweltpolitische *Governance* in den entsprechenden Ländern haben.

Zwar ist das Kyoto-Protokoll erst vor kurzem in Kraft getreten, aber bereits jetzt ist absehbar, dass ein erfolgreicher globaler Klimaschutz langfristig nur möglich ist, wenn es gelingt, auch in Räumen begrenzter Staatlichkeit effektive Klimapolitik zu betreiben. Dies gilt vor allem für ei-

nige Schwellenländer, welche aufgrund ihrer Größe und der Stärke ihres Wachstums das Weltklima nachhaltig beeinflussen können. Ein Mechanismus, welcher dazu beitragen soll, diese Länder in den globalen Klimaschutz mit einzubinden, ist der im Kyoto-Protokoll ausgewiesene *Clean Development Mechanism* (CDM). Dieser setzt auf Klimaschutz-Aktivitäten privatwirtschaftlicher Akteure in Entwicklungs- und Schwellenländern und versucht, eine Art internationalen Markt für Treibhausgasemissionen zu etablieren. Aus der Zusammenarbeit internationaler Organisationen, nationaler Regierungen und nichtstaatlicher Akteure, hier v.a. transnationaler Konzerne, – also gewissermaßen aus einer losen Form von *Private Public Partnerships* (PPP) – sollen konkrete CDM-Klimaschutzprojekte hervorgehen. Über diese CDM-Projekte, wie sie entstehen, im Detail funktionieren und welche Auswirkungen sie haben, ist bis jetzt erstaunlich wenig geforscht worden. Dies gilt vor allem für diejenigen Gastländer, in denen die CDM-Projekte neue Formen von *Governance* aufbauen helfen könnten.

Das Forschungsprojekt wird CDM-Projekte in Brasilien, China und Indien mit Blick auf zwei Fragenkomplexe untersuchen:

(1) Unter welchen *Bedingungen* entstehen die o.g. Partnerschaften und erfolgreiche CDM-Projekte? Welche Rolle spielen und welche Interessen haben jeweils Firmen, internationale Organisationen, Regierungen bzw. andere nationale Institutionen und NGOs mit Blick auf diese Vorhaben?

(2) Welche *institutionellen Auswirkungen* haben diese Partnerschaften und CDM-Projekte? Führen sie zu neuen und effizienten (staatlichen) Strukturen in der Umweltpolitik dieser Länder? Werden langfristig neue *Governance*-Strukturen in Räumen begrenzter Staatlichkeit geschaffen? Falls ja, gehen die ursprünglichen Partnerschaften in dem geschaffenen Markt für Treibhausgasemissionen auf und verlieren ihre induzierende Wirkung oder behalten sie ihre Rolle?

3.3 Ausgangssituation des Teilprojekts

3.3.1 Stand der Forschung

Climate change, its possible consequences, and options to protect the world's climate have become important issues, both in academia and in practice. Yet, while policies have been well studied within the OECD world (see e.g. Hardy 2003; Boehmer-Christiansen/Kellow 2002; Spray 2002 for an overview), there are significant research gaps for countries characterized by limited statehood. Although the Kyoto Protocol has defined “flexible mechanisms” to involve developing and transition countries as well, and action has started already, it is largely left to guesswork *how* decision makers in the public and private sectors in those countries react to and effectively participate in such ambitious policies. This holds true in particular for some of the larger Newly Industrializing Countries where environmental pollution and CO₂ emissions have reached critical levels already, but where effective governance to deal with these issues is poorly developed.

Before we review the literature pertinent to our project more thoroughly, it is essential to understand the broader context of the Kyoto Protocol's flexible mechanisms – in particular the so-called Clean Development Mechanism (CDM): There is broad agreement that the protection of the world's climate is a common good that requires joint action of important CO₂ producers. It was the Kyoto Protocol through which a variety of new modes of governance were introduced in environmental politics. With its so-called “flexible” mechanisms, namely “Emissions Trading” (ET),¹ “Joint Implementation” (JI)² and the “Clean Development Mechanism” (CDM),³ it has emphasized market mechanisms to solve problems of global warming.⁴

The CDM is of special importance for our research project, as it is the only Kyoto mechanism that explicitly includes developing countries (so-called “non-Annex I parties”). The CDM has been designed as an innovative and market-based instrument: all parties to the Kyoto Protocol may finance projects to reduce greenhouse gas emission in developing countries.⁵ Emissions resulting from these projects should be lower than what would have occurred had the prevalent technology been used. Under the CDM, industrialized countries (so-called “Annex I parties”) may then use the Certified Emission Reductions (CERs) generated by such project activities to contribute to compliance with their own mandatory emission commitments. Hence, the CDM allows them to reduce their greenhouse gas emissions in a cost-efficient manner. Alternatively, CERs may also be traded. As a result, the CDM establishes a market where rich countries can buy emission reductions in poor countries. This market has currently a volume of 300 million tons of CO₂ equivalent emission reductions and is expected to grow significantly in the near future (Streck 2004: 306). It is supplemented by a secondary market that facilitates investment and risk management (Larson 2001). The CDM is expected to assist developing countries in achieving *sustainable development* through investments made, for example, in renewable energy projects, thus contributing to the ultimate objective of the Convention (for a detailed overview see Mendis/Openshaw 2004). The CDM is already operating in several developing countries, and the first projects are being launched successfully.

¹ Emissions Trading is set out in Article 17 of the Kyoto Protocol and it permits an Annex I Party to transfer part of its „assigned amount“ (the amount of emissions the Party may emit during the commitment period) to another Annex I Party.

² Joint Implementation refers to the permission of Annex I Parties of the Kyoto Protocol to implement projects that reduce greenhouse gas emissions on a voluntary basis, or enhance removals of greenhouse gases by „sinks“, in addition to what would have occurred otherwise, in the territories of other Parties, and to credit the resulting „emission reduction units“ against their own emission targets.

³ For more details on CDM, see <http://cdm.unfccc.int/> (19.04.2005).

⁴ The Protocol intends to create markets for greenhouse gases (GHG) emission reductions through emission trading and project-based emission crediting. Private and public sector entities aiming at emission reductions can achieve such reductions through the implementation of emission limiting measures in their own installations. Alternatively, they can make use of the CDM and JI and thus allow for a crediting of emission reduction rights for emission reduction projects. Both mechanisms thus attempt to establish a market that is based on the trade of emission rights (carbon market).

⁵ In the following, we distinguish between CDM, which describes the mechanism itself, and CDM projects or project activities, which describes individual activities of firms in specific countries.

For a better understanding of the political processes leading to the implementation of this mechanism and for analyzing the changes it might bring about in host countries, our project can build on two broader academic debates:

- (1) Debate on the *evolving modes of environmental and (multi-level) governance*;
- (2) Debate on *domestic institutional change* and *political repercussions* that such new modes of governance might have in areas with limited statehood.

(ad 1) Why and how do new forms of environmental governance evolve?

Research on the causes for newly evolving modes of environmental governance can be divided in two strands. First, some scholars stress the importance of new actors, in particular private business actors and International Organizations (IOs), and how they work together in issue-oriented Public Private Partnerships (PPP). Second, other authors focus on national arrangements of particular (“pioneering”) states, and how such arrangements support policy diffusion. We will discuss both contributions which are crucial for our project design. Both strands will be briefly discussed in the following.

The role of private business actors: How PPP may become effective problem solvers

In the debate on new modes of governance, authors have stressed the importance of new actors, in particular non-state actors, involved in processes of political decision-making (see e.g. Pierre 2000) and to the shift from hierarchical forms of management towards “softer” methods of coordination (see *SFB* framework paper). Our project focuses in particular on multi-level and global environmental governance in which non-state business actors participate at all levels (Esty/Ivanova 2002; Knill/Lehmkuhl 2002). The main assumption of this literature is that private business actors have acquired new forms of authority with successive global changes towards privatization, liberalization and deregulation, and, thus, have changed politics, especially international politics from the bottom up (Brühl et al. 2004: Ch. 2; Fuhr 1998, 2001). Scholars point out that private agents do not only engage in traditional lobbying or agenda-setting, and, thus, exercise power, but that such power is increasingly perceived by governments and by the public as being legitimate (Cutler et al. 1999; Florini 2000: 15). While private businesses were regarded as polluters for a long time (Reed 1996: Ch. 13), and, hence, as part of the problem (see Fuhr et al. 1998 for an overview), authors such as Cashore (2002) and Streck (2002) emphasize that business actors can be important contributors to environmental protection and, thus, become part of the solution. Business contributions are supposed to be advantageous because of their technical expertise and their financial resources that could be used for efficient policy development (ibid.). The underlying decision-making processes that such involvement require, however, are mostly analyzed rather broadly (OECD 1997; Thatcher 1998; Xu 1999) or within domestic or inter-state frameworks (Haas et al. 1993; Young 1994; Susskind 1994; Obser 1999). Moreover, empirical studies are lacking on key issues, such as management problems or the role of envi-

ronmental innovations. This holds true for emerging designs governance structures for Kyoto mechanisms in general, and for the CDM in particular (cf. Haites/Yamin 2000; Baumert et al. 2000; for a valuable exception see Lecocq 2003; for an optimistic perspective Streck 2004; Browne 2004). We will try to close this research gap by showing why and how the involvement of private business actors can contribute to the development of these new forms of governance.

We can also build on the literature on *global public policy networks* or *public private partnerships*, which describes cross-sectoral partnerships between state and non-state actors, both non-profit and for-profit (Messner 1997; Reinicke 1998; Reinicke et al. 2000). PPP are regarded as practical solutions to global problems that cannot be solved either by private actors or by individual governments which often lack the means and the legitimacy to achieve successful results on their own. This holds in particular for most countries in the developing world (OECD 2004a). Multi-level governance encompassing private actors and international organizations is, thus, regarded as key for the formulation of effective policies and for their implementation. In many issue areas, particularly in environmental policy making, IOs, NGOs, and the private business sector are expected to jointly provide the expertise and the necessary resources to complement traditional state action.

In recognizing the implications of global warming, the World Bank, for example, approved the establishment of the Prototype Carbon Fund (PCF) in 1999. The PCF, with its operational objective of mitigating climate change, seeks to promote the World Bank's objective of sustainable development, and, at the same time, to demonstrate the options for PPP, and to offer an opportunity of "learning by doing" to its stakeholders (World Bank 2004). Our research will analyze whether such evolving PPP are successful and under what conditions, since much of the literature on PPP often appears to be rather normative, particularly in the context of developing countries. This literature stresses desirable alternatives to (traditionally weak) service provision by public agencies (Fiszbein/Lowden 1999; Rosenau Vaillancourt 2000). Moreover, there is little knowledge on the dynamics of such PPP, e.g., whether PPP are sustainable, or whether they are just transitory arrangements that need to be reintegrated into the public domain at some point in time. We also lack knowledge concerning the potentially positive as well as negative consequences that PPP might have for the development of public policies in states with weak regulatory capacity. The literature often simply assumes rather than demonstrates empirically that partnerships replace state action, and that desired outputs can be delivered in a sustainable manner. This is precisely what our project intends to investigate.

Environmental policy analysis – or how 'best practices' diffuse horizontally

Another important literature for our purposes concerns the research carried out by scholars of comparative national environmental policy. Largely neglected by studies on international environmental institutions, this research suggests that globalization through the diffusion of national environmental policies (rather than IOs) was responsible for the environmental successes of the

last decades (Jänicke/Jörgens 1998; Jänicke/Weidner 1997; Busch/Jörgens 2004). This literature suggests that globalized environmental policies are the outcome of horizontal policy diffusion, at times – but not exclusively – pushed forward by private business actors. Research on this topic has produced (i) case studies on diffusion processes, (ii) studies on the role of pioneering countries; and (iii) studies on international markets as a crucial factor in shaping diffusion of environmental policy (Tews/Busch 2002). Findings indicate that lead markets in which environmentally friendly technologies and policies have been developed, initiate diffusion processes to other countries through market mechanisms, largely without being influenced by international institutions (Jänicke/Jacob 2002). National institutional arrangements are regarded as filters for innovation, with individual arrangements explaining possible variation (Tews et al. 2003: 576f.; Busch/Jörgens 2004).

However, research on environmental policy diffusion focuses almost exclusively on OECD countries. It remains to be seen whether its assumptions hold true for countries with limited statehood, or whether the involvement of international institutions is necessary to create the conditions under which diffusion becomes possible. There are numerous indications that private sector driven innovations in environmental technologies – and the diffusion of such innovations by firms with strategic orientation – indeed provide powerful new incentives for domestic environmental adjustments. They may trigger policy change toward reducing energy consumption and/or emissions, even in areas of limited statehood and, in particular, in NICs (as suggested in IPCC 2000; Garcia-Johnson 2000; Jänicke/Jacob 2002).⁶ Moreover, the literature about PPP suggests that incentives provided by external actors might often be critical to get such processes started.

Keeping these two debates in mind, we will analyze whether horizontal policy diffusion can be recognized in the field of climate protection at all. We will also investigate how private sector involvement (both international and national), together with international organizations and NGOs, might eventually trigger such diffusion and sustain it.

(ad 2) Development studies and public management in developing countries – what kind of institutional change can be expected?

Whereas research on environmental policies and multilateral decision-making within OECD countries is well established, our knowledge is rather scattered on environmental policy making, the implementation processes, and the structural changes that can be witnessed within developing countries and NICs (Gupta 1997; Sathaye 1999). There are many publications that just highlight specific local environmental issues, often with a rather strong project focus (World Bank 1995; Chen/Lotspeich 1998). These studies often do not analyze (i) the policy process that may

⁶ Concerning carbon finance, the World Bank lists 141 companies that are active as service providers for anyone who would like to jump into this market. This already indicates that carbon finance has become a lucrative business. See <http://carbonfinance.org/Router.cfm?Page=ProvList>.

lead (or not) to desired environmental action (cf. Di 1999; Lemos 1998); or (ii) the effects of economic incentives towards enforcing desired environmental rules (as compared to sanctions; see e.g. Dasgupta 2000). Unfortunately, there is also a lack of studies on *de facto* ‘silent’ progress in some countries and neglected opportunities for using CDM (Haïtes 2004; Sims 1999; Zhang 2000).

There is an enormous literature on the role of IOs, such as aid agencies, and their importance for policy change in developing countries. In fact, supporters and critics agree that IOs provide critical resources and that they are responsible for *de facto* policy change (already Biersteker 1992) – for good or for bad, and even more so in countries with weak state capacity. In addition, development research has highlighted how bargaining on such change (mostly connected to structural adjustment programs) takes place between IOs, the recipient country’s public administration, and concerned coalitions of reformers (Nelson 1989; Mosley et al 1991; Haggard/Kaufman 1992; Heller et al. 1998).

While this literature on broader developmental issues is well established, and instrumental to our research, little is known about the role of *private* international business in inducing policy change, in particular in the field of environmental policy making. Many authors stress the notion of rather passive governments that ultimately accepts (almost any) offer for investment by international business (e.g. Brühl et al. 2001). This work highlights the adverse effects of networks of corruption. Such approaches neglect the various links that private actors establish with other non-state actors, and with local private business, and how such alliances create a demand for new institutional arrangements that state and public administration which are interested in fostering economic development, eventually deem important to provide (cf. Fuhr 1998, 2001; and case studies in Campbell/Fuhr 2004). Hence, while IO – government relationships in rule making are rather well known, rule making through private sector “loops” within developing countries is analyzed quite rarely.

While the literature on (new) public management (NPM) is quite useful for analyzing emerging market incentives within the public sector, it remains somewhat limited in analytical scope for the purposes of our research. Most of the literature just reviews NPM reforms and arrangements in OECD countries (e.g. Pollitt/Bouckaert 2000; Wollmann 2001), and some authors question the use of such concepts in states with low state capacity (e.g. Schick 1998; McCourt/Minogue 2001; Therkildsen 2000). Other studies reflect practical experience (CLAD 2000; Bresser Pereira 1999; Luiz Abrucio/Mendes Ferreira Costa 1998) or review issues from a business administration point of view (Jones et al. 2001; Corkery et al. 1998).

In contrast, our case studies will provide a more thorough analysis of such private sector driven “loops,” and explain in more detail how they emerge, how they influence rule setting and the gradual institutionalization in countries with low state capacity. Interestingly, institutionalization of climate-related environmental policies – in our case: kick-started through CDM – could well

mean “marketization”, with some of the new policies being locked in through evolving *market* mechanisms. Hence, countries with limited statehood that are unable to develop, manage and implement environmental policies, may be able to “leapfrog” *straight* into new steering options, bypassing traditional hierarchical and rule-based *governance*.

A Synthesis

Based on these two broader academic debates, we will generate various hypotheses from the literature on global governance and private actors, in particular PPP. We will test whether diffusion plays a role in the promotion of CDM, thus contributing to the production of the global public good of climate protection. Finally, we analyze institutional change guided by studies from the development literature and the scholarship on public management.

We assume that the involvement of the business sector might not constitute a threat to governance (Reed 1996), but might as well have a positive influence on the evolving modes of *governance* (Fuhr et al. 1998). While this assumption contradicts the trend in both public and academic debates, our knowledge about the current and potential roles of national and international for-profit sectors remains extremely limited (Sorrell/Skea 1999; Di 1999), as compared to the role of the non-profit sector (Princen/Finger 1994; Lemos 1998). However, private sector involvement and PPP in the environment seem to increasingly complement public sector policies (IPCC 2000). In fact, they might actually be crucial to *trigger* effective policy making in countries with limited statehood, and speed-up technological and environmental policy change (cf. Chichilnisky/Heal 2000; Garcia-Johnson 2000).

3.3.2 Eigene Vorarbeiten

Various contributions by the principal investigator explore the question of public private cooperation in less developed countries (LDCs), as well as domestic institutional change induced by international organizations and transnationally operating private enterprises. We expect similar patterns in the area of climate change. The principal investigator has contributor as lead author to the World Bank’s “flagship publication” (1997) on the changing role of the state, analyzing in depth the dynamics of public sector change in a comparative way and with particular emphasis on developing and transition countries. The report also stressed the adverse effects of low state capacity for future developmental efforts. Fuhr (2004a, b, 2000a, b) as well as Campbell/Fuhr (2004) explore systematically how external actors provide effective incentives for domestic policy change. The studies mostly analyzed state reform and governance issues, also at the sub-national level, since such reforms ultimately documented *de facto* shifts from state-led to market-led development.

Fuhr et al. (1998) explored the complex links between structural adjustment programs, with their stronger focus on private sector investment, and their potential impact on the urban environment in LDCs. The latter research which was commissioned by a rather skeptical WWF, highlighted

the importance of domestic state capacities to mitigate environmental damage through adjustment programs, and to even improve environmental policies. Fuhr (1998, 2001) also emphasized the multiple incentives toward institutional and policy change in LDCs, stressing in particular „constructive pressures” by international non-state and business actors. Environmental policies in LDCs constitute an excellent example of how such change occurs through foreign private investment, technology diffusion and anticipated environmental regulation, and how such processes could be sustained, e.g. through enhanced market forces, and increasing self-regulation.

Furthermore, the applicant’s chair has considerable expertise in (i) policy research in developing and OECD countries; (ii) research on multilateral organizations; (iii) international cooperation with developing countries; (iv) research on the management of ‘global public policies’, with focus on environmental policies. Moreover, principal investigator has well established contacts to (v) decision makers as well as experts in NIC governments and respective research institutes; and to (vi) experts and staff in multilateral organizations working on environmental issues in selected NICs. This concerns particularly experts involved in projects of the Global Environmental Facility (GEF) and Prototype Carbon Fund (PCF) initiatives. Last but not least, the principal investigator, prior to his current position, has had substantial practical exposure to states with low capacity, in particular as task manager of international programs aimed at enhancing the „modernization” of such states, and as member of task forces/ multilevel PPP with similar objectives.

3.3.3 Liste der publizierten einschlägigen Vorarbeiten

I. Referierte Veröffentlichungen

a) *in wissenschaftlichen Zeitschriften*

Fuhr, Harald 2001: Constructive Pressures and Incentives to Reform: Globalization and its Impact on Public Sector Performance and Governance in Developing Countries. In: Hulme, D. and Polidano, Ch. (eds.): Governance Reform in Developing Countries. Special Edition of „Public Management Review”, 3: 3, 419-443.

--- 1999: Institutional Change and New Incentive Structures for Development: Can Decentralization and Better Local Governance Help? in: WeltTrends 2, 21-51.

b) *auf wesentlichen Fachkongressen*

Fuhr, Harald 2003: „Institutional Reforms for Market-led Development and Competitiveness in Latin America – Some Conceptual Inputs”, UN-Economic Commission on Latin America Seminar on „Institutional Requirements for Market-led Development in Latin America and the Carribean” Santiago de Chile, 23-24. Januar 2003.

--- 2001: „Public Sector Modernization and Improving Governance in Latin America – Lessons from a Decade of International Development Assistance”, CLAD Annual Congress on „State Reform in Latin America”, Buenos Aires, 3-8. November 2001.

c) *in monographischen Reihen und Sammelbänden*

Campbell, T. and Harald Fuhr, eds. 2004: Leadership and Innovation in Subnational Government: Case Studies from Latin America. The World Bank Institute: Washington DC., 450 p.

Fuhr, Harald 2004a: „The World Bank’s Assistance to Public Sector Reform in Latin America – Experiences and New Challenges”. In: Benz, A. et al. (eds.): Institutionenbildung in Regierung und Verwaltung. Festschrift für Klaus König. Nomos Verlag: Baden-Baden, 631-646.

World Bank. 1997: World Development Report 1997 „The State in a Changing World“. The World Bank/ Oxford University Press: New York, 265 p. (jointly with A. Chhibber, S. Commander, A. Evans, C. Kane, C. Leechor, B. Levy, S. Pradhan und B. Weder)

II. Nicht referierte Veröffentlichungen

d) *in wissenschaftlichen Zeitschriften*

e) *auf wesentlichen Fachkongressen*

Fuhr, Harald 2004b: „Local Worlds and Transnational Ties“, University of Potsdam Sadat Academy for Management Sciences; Cairo University; Teheran University „Social Life, Civil Society, and Governance“ Potsdam; 4-6. Oktober 2004.

f) *in monographischen Reihen und Sammelbänden*

Fuhr, Harald, Hodick, B., Krause, P. and Scherff H. 2004c: Wirkungen und Wirkungsmessung in der Entwicklungszusammenarbeit: Dezentralisierungspolitiken und deren Beitrag zu Demokratisierung und Armutsbekämpfung. Bundesministerium für Wirtschaftliche Zusammenarbeit und Entwicklung (BMZ): Bonn.

--- 2000a: „Staatsreform und Verwaltungsmodernisierung in Lateinamerika“. In: Braig, M., ed. Staat und Markt im Entwicklungsprozeß. Deutsches Übersee-Institut Hamburg, Hamburg, 89-110.

--- 2000b: „Developing a Culture of Good Governance“. In: Theron, F., van Rooyen J., and van Baalen J. eds. Good Governance for People: Policy and Management. University of Stellenbosch/ School of Public Management and Planning: Stellenbosch, 64-74.

---, K. Roeken, M. Schaper and A. Wegener 1998: Macroeconomic Policies, Poverty, and the Urban Environment. World Wildlife Fund for Nature: Washington DC., 70 p.

--- 1998: Konstruktiver Globalisierungsdruck? Zu den veränderten Rahmenbedingungen für staatliches Handeln und „governance“ in Entwicklungsländern, in: Bundesministerium für wirtschaftliche Zusammenarbeit und Entwicklung/ Deutsche Gesellschaft für Technische Zusammenarbeit, ed. Globalisierung: Chancen und Herausforderungen für die Entwicklungszusammenarbeit. Bonn/ Eschborn, 65-76.

3.4 Planung des Teilprojekts

3.4.1 Forschungsziele und Leitfragen

The project analyzes the involvement of business actors who participate in CDM projects, in fostering new modes of governance in the realm of climate protection in countries with limited statehood, in our case selected Newly Industrializing Countries (NICs).⁷ The project has *two* sets of research questions and respective hypotheses that emerge from the discussion of the literature above:

- (1) We ask why and how new modes of *environmental governance* evolve through specific forms of Public Private Partnerships (PPP) within the CDM framework. Our first dependent variable concerns, thus, the *emergence of private sector driven CDM projects*. Such projects result from different types of multi-level PPP, encompassing governments, international organizations (IOs), and transnational as well as national non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and transnational corporations (TNCs). The *indicators* used for identifying the successful establishment of a CDM project are (i) a treaty being agreed upon and signed, specifying carbon emission reductions in the host country and (ii) first evident steps towards implementing the treaty. We develop four working hypotheses related to this set of questions.

(2) We investigate the *governance* effects of such CDM projects once implemented in countries with limited statehood. We ask *whether and what kind of new (and sustainable) environmental rules and procedures* for effective climate protection develop in the countries investigated. Here, we expect variance on the dependent variable. We have three working hypotheses related to this set of questions.

(ad 1) Emerging new modes of environmental governments including business involvement

First, we ask why CDM projects are being set up at all: What is the driving force for private business to become involved in carbon finance and emission trade, and what type of companies are engaging within these respective markets?

As the establishment of CDM is nothing less than setting up an international market, CDM projects can only work effectively when the business sector is genuinely interested – and successfully engaged. However, the carbon market is not yet a viable market by itself that would *induce* business actors to become involved. The assumption that profit derived from business in the market is the only incentive companies care about, does not carry far here. Consequently, as is often argued, IOs might have an important role to play and to provide initial financial resources. In this context, one can point to the World Bank, which, together with some OECD countries and private sector participants, established three Carbon Funds: the “Prototype Carbon Fund” (PCF), the “Community Development Carbon Fund” (CDCF), and the “Bio Carbon Fund” (BioCF). These funds are supposed to act as catalysts in the setting up of CDM projects, because they provide seed money for the development of CDM projects and expertise concerning the above-mentioned secondary market (e.g., dealing with information asymmetries) as well as methodological help. Such analysis would be consistent with the literature on other PPP and would also be supported by many development experts who stress the role of IOs in jumpstarting policy change:

Working Hypothesis 1: The more financial resources and expertise are provided by International Organization, the more private business actors enter CDM arrangements.

The hypothesis would be verified if IOs are financially engaged and provide a significant percentage (>25 per cent) of the seed money for setting up a CDM project and related instruments. They stay financially engaged in the first years of individual CDM projects.

The carbon market is located within a political minefield. The CDM itself is sometimes labeled the “Kyoto surprise” (Werksmann 1998), as it combines the rather divergent interests and motivations of the developing and the developed world (Oberthür/Ott 1999). As literature points out, one reason why the CDM came about and is actually working quite well seems to be the mediating influence and the scrutiny of civil society actors and NGOs in this issue area. Lately, how-

⁷ On the problematic nature of these labels – *Schwellenländer* in German – see the *SFB* framework paper as well as A1 Risse/Lehmkuhl.

ever, NGOs have criticized CDM projects for not promoting sustainable development, as only 10 percent of all projects have been in the area of renewable energy. Others criticize that CDM projects only serve as a marketing instrument for big business (Pearson 2004). It is, thus, an empirically important question to clarify what influence NGOs – in particular, NGOs within host countries – really have in this policy field:

Working Hypothesis 2: The more civil society actors and (I)NGOs mobilize with regard to CDM projects, the more private business will either not engage at all in CDM projects or will enter arrangements in the area of renewable energy.

Another criterion for the successful establishment of CDM activities is the motivation of the business actors themselves. Two issues are involved here. First, there is a clear economic incentive to engage in CDM projects for those companies which still need to reach their Kyoto targets, but have already invested in the best available “clean” technology at home. The “cleaner” they produce at home, the more costly it is to upgrade technology at home in order to meet their reduction targets. Hence, there is an economic incentive to invest in CDM projects in the host country. Second, it is likely that business actors do not get involved in CDM projects only for financial gains⁸ or for the financial incentives provided by IOs, but also for marketing reasons. We can, thus, expect that primarily companies which hope to gain from a “green” image will participate. In fact, “greening” (formerly “grey”) companies may turn out to be a strategy to improve competitiveness (Moore/Miller 1994: Ch. IV; Kütting 2004). This reasoning leads to two hypotheses:

Working Hypothesis 3a: The “cleaner” a company produces at home, the more costly it is to upgrade technology to reach the Kyoto targets. As a result, these companies incur a strong economic incentive to invest in CDM projects.

Working Hypothesis 3b: The more a company is in need to develop a new image as „green company” (thereby expecting to improve competitiveness), the more likely it will engage in CDM projects.

The first two hypotheses reflect the analyses of PPP. The third relates to this area as well, but also encompasses some *corporate governance* issues. Following the literature on policy diffusion one could argue, though, that possible trends in the convergence of governance patterns result from the fact that governments orient their policies to what is already practiced in lead countries (Tews et al. 2003: 570f.). Governments might then define a national strategy for taking up a frontrunner position explicitly, and, thus, for engaging proactively in a number of CDM pilot projects. Thus, lead markets and national institutional arrangements would contribute to

⁸ As it has been mentioned, the market is rather small so far and seems not to be very profitable yet (Chichilnisky/Heal 2000).

policy diffusion as a result of which one should focus on domestic structures rather than on international factors.

Working Hypothesis 4a: The more governments try to emulate lead countries, the more they will successfully set up and promote CDM projects.

Working Hypothesis 4b: Possible variations of implementing CDM projects depend on national institutional arrangements: The more a country fosters its domestic business actors to become involved in CDM, the more likely it is that international “green” companies and global PPP engage here as well.

The hypotheses would be validated if there exists a high correlation between the setting up of CDM projects and the openness towards foreign businesses. A possible proxy for such openness to foreign enterprises is the amount of Foreign Direct Investments (FDI)/ GDP a country receives, the ratio of trade/ GDP, or the Economic Freedom Index by Freedom House. Moreover, one should see pro-active behaviour of host governments – particularly of environmental bureaucracies – to support CDM projects.

Hypotheses 4a) and 4b) partly contradict the first three ones. But they may also be supplementary by differentiating in more detail the conditions under which PPP will be created at all. Yet, these hypotheses are situated on a different level of analysis and, if found to be valid, the suggested influence of PPP and of internationally operating “green companies” on the successful formation of CDM projects would be of less importance than assumed in hypotheses 1-3.

(ad 2) Governance effects: new (and sustainable) environmental rules and procedures for effective climate protection in countries with limited statehood

The successful setting up of CDM activities (independent variable) and the steady involvement of private business actors have consequences on environmental policy making within host countries (dependent variable). We will ask whether the changes induced by CDM are actually for good, i.e. lead to better public policy. We will also try to find out whether the involvement of IOs and of the private sector lead to the development of more effective environmental policy making in these states in general. What do such processes look like? Do the joint activities of IOs, private business, and NGOs result in a more legitimate approach towards environmental protection, and how sustainable are such in-country PPP? Does a real market for carbon emissions develop gradually, which – then regulated by supply and demand – does no longer need complex PPP arrangements? But it is also possible that the involvement of transnational PPP and the opening up towards the influence of business actors may have significant repercussions, and lead to more efficiency. Such a development would be consistent with assumptions of the new public management literature (Jones et al 2001: Ch. 4, Turner/Hulme 1997: Ch. 5, 8).

Working Hypothesis 5: The more private business actors and corresponding PPP engage in areas with limited statehood through CDM, the more pressure is created to conduct a more efficient environmental policy in general.

As the development literature suggests, externally financed structural adjustment programs helped reducing state interventionism and strengthening market mechanisms in recipient countries throughout the 1990s (World Bank 1997). Once broader liberalization and deregulation by governments became credible, private businesses (both national and international) stepped in more forcefully, thickening the evolving institutional mesh. Similarly, we assume that the principal incentive to environmental policy change in countries with weak state capacity might well be market mechanisms, transported by the CDM initially and then carried forward. This would resemble the ideas about policy diffusion, but, this time, not from a lead market in one country but rather from one lead sector (climate change) to others. Hence, market-driven PPP would trigger policy change that governments alone would not (or could not) initiate on their own. Such a process could have the following sequence: (i) setting up PPP with strong private sector involvement; (ii) defining the initial CDM project; (iii) various iterations of CDM projects; (iv) initiating market-rules in climate change policy, and (v) broader market-based environmental policies. Consequently, successfully participating countries might leapfrog from “no action” to “proactive green policies” within short periods of time compared to OECD countries. The literature on new public management provides plenty of evidence for private sector-related and efficiency-enhancing reforms, at least in specified areas of public administration (e.g. Jones et al. 2001; Barzelay 2003). The literature on “best practice” points in the same direction. This leads to the following hypothesis:

Working Hypothesis 6: The more CDM projects are successfully established, the more likely it is that the introduction of market mechanisms becomes an accepted mode of governance in environmental policy making, while a state bureaucracy is being set up to regulate the institutional arrangements.

Another important question relates to the purpose for which PPP may serve in the medium-term, once the new market mechanism is well established. It might well be that at one point in time neither the financial resources nor the ideational input of IOs and NGOs are necessary any longer for the market to function efficiently, i.e. to find an equilibrium between the demand and supply of carbon emission reductions. At this point, the PPP in the field of climate protection will have served their kick-starting and transitory role – and the supervisory functions of the market may later be performed by classical state actors, such as regulatory agencies. Alternatively, PPP may serve monitoring functions, similar to e.g. social policy reform (cf. e.g. Kondo 2002; CLAD 2000).

Working Hypothesis 7: The more mature the market mechanism becomes and the more integrated a single state is in this market, the less important the original PPP become.

3.4.2 Methoden und Operationalisierung

The working hypotheses serve as *guiding posts* for carrying out the overall research. In particular, the second set of hypotheses contains possible scenarios rather than clear-cut predictions. Thus, we will not test the hypotheses quantitatively. At this point, the working assumptions rather describe the perspective in which our research is going.

We will analyze one sector (climate protection) in three countries (Brazil, China, and India – see below). Such a one-sector-multi-country-strategy allows us to verify whether evolving new modes of *Governance* in environmental policy making is part of a global trend or whether they are country-specific. Our comparative analysis will, however, take into account domestic institutional arrangements, and specific actors and interests, to see whether they play any role in a potential diffusion of the observed policies.

As the changes we want to explore have only been taking place recently and have just started to leave their first traces within the countries examined, case studies supported by inquiries through a series of field studies and through semi-structured interviews will be our method of choice. We will, however, not limit ourselves to oral testimonies and will evaluate the working hypotheses through an examination of actual business strategies as well as through a close reading of policy proposals and legislation. In particular, we will try to use the method of process-tracing for the second part of the project (analysis of institutional change), closely focusing on the role of business agents in the various stages of the CDM- and policy process within the countries (agenda-setting, rule formulation, implementation, and patterns of compliance).

Our *case selection* is guided by the following criteria:

- (1) We focus only on areas with *limited statehood*. In our project, these are countries which have weak state capacity, in particular in environmental policy and management. Regulations, for example, are in place but are not efficiently implemented or one can witness a great variance in local implementation. For state capacity in the field of environmental policy we rely on the data of the 2005 Environmental Sustainability Index (ESI 2005a).⁹
- (2) The cases must be *relevant*, that is, they must promise to be important players – maybe even environmental leaders – in climate change. This criteria is fulfilled when countries are recognized as industrializing and thus have a significant amount of CO₂ emissions. Countries

⁹ The Environmental Sustainability Index (ESI) benchmarks the ability of nations to protect the environment and tracks 76 indicators from urban population weighted NO₂ concentration to Import of polluting goods and raw materials as percentage of total imports of goods and services. We do not take the whole ESI into account but focus on those indicators that are used to describe „Environmental Governance“ (ESI 2005a, 14-15).

which do not need emission reductions and where, thus, CDM is likely to be nothing but a business opportunity are not considered (e.g. Costa Rica).

- (3) The countries have some *commitment and preparedness* to engage with international actors that is, they are willing to allow business actors to become active in the environment and they must allow IOs to play a substantive part. However, in order to validate whether national institutions play an important role in the acceptance of CDM projects, the countries selected have some variance in their domestic institutional structure, in particular concerning their openness towards IOs, NGOs, and private business actors.

(ad 1) Weak state capacity

We have identified China, India, and Brazil as cases for the first project phase of the *SFB*. These countries are characterized by limited statehood in the following sense (see also *SFB* framework paper). While they enjoy the monopoly on the legitimate use of force, they experience severe deficiencies concerning state capacity in general, and in the field of environmental policy in particular. All three countries have state capacities well below OECD standards. The same holds even more true for environmental policies (measured by the indicators of the ESI 2005b: 123, 133, 165 for Brazil, China, and India respectively). Brazil has the best score overall. Nevertheless, its *Environmental Governance* is still being considered as weak. India and China are ranked in the cluster of countries which have the lowest scores overall. Within this cluster India, however, does better than the rest, while China is doing extremely bad.

(ad 2) Relevance of the cases

All three states are emerging industrializing economies (NICs). They represent almost half of the world population and, by this criteria alone, are likely to influence success or failure of global environmental policies (Sathaye 1999). The three countries face severe environmental damage already, particularly in urban centres, and all three are likely to be severely affected by climate change (e.g. Chen/Lotspeich 1998). In fact, unless guided by appropriate environmental policies, catch-up growth would be extremely harmful for both local eco-systems as well as the global climate. Furthermore, these are the countries where most carbon market transactions are supposed to take place. Involving this group of countries is, thus, key for sound climate change policies, and for the provision of the global public good of climate protection. Moreover, if PPP can make a difference and bring about change in these critical countries, there is some hope that climate protection can be fostered in other regions of the world as well.

(ad 3) Preparedness to engage, and variance in cases

The first projects are already being set up in the selected countries, and there is evidence that Clean Development Mechanism projects are successfully implemented by business actors, e.g., through the World Bank's Carbon Funds. Furthermore, the Asian Development Bank is about to

start a similar fund for China and India. A recent study of the OECD identified four planned CDM projects in China, 15 in Brazil, and 23 in India (OECD 2004b: 40f. and 6). Furthermore, there are signs in all three countries that participation in the Carbon Finance Business is already leading to changes in environmental policy making, and, thus, to new modes of *governance*.

Brazil

Brazil plays an important role in the development of the CDM, as it was *inter alia* the Brazilian government that proposed the idea in the first place. Of the three cases, Brazil was therefore regarded for a long time as one of the most promising countries to embrace CDM projects and has, in fact, hosted the first CDM initiative – a rural energy project which was conducted in partnership with BP (WBCSD 2004: 5). It could, thus, be the lead country from which diffusion to other NICs takes place. Similar to the other two cases, the energy sector is seen as the most promising one. However, doubts have emerged lately whether Brazil can still implement many CDM projects in the energy sector, as most of its electricity is derived from water power (90%) and it is obvious that such energy production does not lend itself to emission reductions. Nevertheless, domestic players in Brazil, in particular the industrial sector, are already involved in planning further CDM activities (UNIDO 2003: 7). Brazil has also developed a rather sophisticated institutional structure to deal with CDM projects, but openly acknowledges that more capacities are needed since expertise is highly concentrated. There is a strong involvement of the NGO sector in Brazilian politics as well, now even strengthened under the presidency of Lula da Silva.

China

China ratified the Kyoto protocol in 2002, but has otherwise not taken active steps regarding climate protection. The CDM process is seen as offering important opportunities for sustainable development, particularly in the energy sector that is still dominated by coal. It is estimated that China's potential share of the world's carbon trading market could be up to 50 percent (World Bank 2004 et al.: XIII). Considering the importance of the Chinese market, it is hardly surprising that several international actors (World Bank, Asian Development Bank, GTZ, but also, and of utmost interest to us, BP) are conducting studies concerning CDMs, or start setting up CDM projects in China. The donors and the Chinese government seem to agree that involving China within the CDM process will not only have a significant impact on the Chinese economy, but also pave the way for new energy and environmental policies. A recent study by the World Bank stresses the importance of capacity building, before CDM projects can be successfully implemented (Zhang 2004: 4). Whether such institutional change is underway already is doubtful as, for example, the government was initially very hesitant to engage with the World Bank's Prototype Carbon Fund. It only decided in 2003 to sign up as a host country. Although China is very open towards Foreign Direct Investment, there are many strings attached. China is also the country in our sample which has opened up least towards IOs, and, even less towards NGOs.

India

India does not have large primary energy reserves, but faces a growing population and rapidly increasing energy demands. The government has pushed hard to increase the utilization of renewable energy technology. Renewable energy projects can significantly reduce greenhouse gas emissions. They are very attractive for CDM projects, although the projects face high upfront costs (Ministry of Non-Conventional Energy Sources India 2004: 8). India produced CO₂-equivalent emissions of about 1000 billion tones in 1990 (equal to 3 per cent of global emissions). It is estimated that India would capture about 10 percent of the global CDM market, thereby generating revenues ranging from 10 to 300 million Euro annually (Babu/Michaelowa 2003: 11). It comes as no surprise that the government pushed hard for the embracement of the CDM market and has encouraged the involvement of private business actors, despite the country's long tradition of protectionism. The first five CDM projects were approved in 2003, others were submitted in response to the call for tenders by the governments of Sweden and Finland, as well as by the World Bank's three Carbon Funds (PCF, BioCF, CDCF). Two Indian financing institutions have also recently set up their own Carbon Funds. These initiatives have already brought about institutional change, as the responsible Ministry of Environment and Forest (MoEF) seems to have gained leverage in comparison to other ministries. In addition, there is a traditionally strong co-optation of, and cooperation with, non-governmental organizations in Indian politics, and we will review their respective influence on the emerging carbon market.

3.4.3 Arbeitsprogramm und Zeitplan

As the mechanisms under investigation are only about to be set up, the project's initial phase has an explorative character and we will map the existing CDM projects in the three countries and then identify a number of specific cases in order to conduct more in-depth studies evaluating our working hypotheses (first six months of 2006). At the same time, we will prepare a questionnaire for the planned interviews which will start in mid-2006 and will continue throughout 2007. We will conduct semi-structured interviews with decision-makers and experts in International Organizations (in particular with World Bank, Asian Development Bank, UNEP, DG Trade and DG Enterprises of the EU), Representatives of NGOs (for example with Regional offices of the Climate Action Network (CAN), Greenpeace International and local Greenpeace offices, Worldwatch Institute), and with business actors (for example with RWE, BP, World Business Council for Sustainable Development, World Chambers Federation). We will evaluate whether the proposed hypotheses concerning the conditions of success have proven helpful or whether other hypotheses have to be considered. A first milestone for the project is set for the end of 2007 when a draft article by the project team will be ready. The article will present the findings of the interviews, defining the conditions of success under which identified PPP are taking place.

In the third year, we will start focusing on the effects of the PPP within the countries. We will therefore prepare our field studies at the beginning of 2008 and will have completed them by the

end of the year. We will conduct interviews with *local partners* of the scientific, business as well as NGO communities. We will also speak to officials in the concerned ministries, and to stakeholders of the CDM projects. Furthermore, we will analyze local documents and the strategies of local business actors. Our guiding concern will be the analysis of the consequences the newly formed PPP have for the institutional structure and the state capacity of the countries in question. These field studies will be planned in close cooperation with the following local institutions and experts who have already pledged their support:

- *Escola de Administração de Empresas de São Paulo, Fundação Getulio Vargas, São Paulo, Brazil* (contact: Prof. Simon Schwartzman; Av. Nove de Julho 2029 – Bela Vista 01313 902; Sao Paulo; phone: +55 11 3281 7700) (www.fgvsp.br)
- *Hong Kong Polytechnic University, Department of Business Studies, Hung Hom, Kowloon, Hong Kong* (contact: Assistant professor Xinpeng Xu, Ph.D.; School of Accounting and Finance; Office M837, Li Ka Shing Tower; phone: +852 2766 7139; mail: buxxu@inet.polyu.edu.hk) (<http://www.acad.polyu.edu.hk/~afxu>)
- *The Energy and Resources Institute (TERI), New Delhi, India* (contact: Director-General R K Pachauri, Ph.D.; Habitat Place, Lodhi Road; New Dehli 110003, India; phone: + 91 11 2468 2121/ 2122; mail: pachauri@teri.res.in) (www.teriin.org)

Other foreign based institutions which have guaranteed their support and which will be helpful in identifying interview partners, are:

- The Department of Environmental Policy Analysis at the Institute for Environmental Studies of the *Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam, The Netherlands* (contact: Director Prof. Frank Biermann – De Boelelaan 1085-1087, 1081 HV Amsterdam, The Netherlands; phone: +31 20 4449959; mail: frank.biermann@ivm.falw.vu.nl) (www.falw.vu.nl/english/index.cfm)
- Climate Focus – Partners in the Carbon Market (Climate consultancy), The Netherlands (contact: Dr. Charlotte Streck, J.B. Bakemakade 86, 3071 ME Rotterdam, The Netherlands; phone: +31 102900623; mail: C.Streck@climatefocus.com) (www.climatefocus.com)
- World Bank – Climate Change Program, Washington (contact: Todd Johnson, 1818 H Street, NW #MC4-407, Washington, DC 20433, USA; phone: +1 2025223773) (<http://lnweb18.worldbank.org/ESSD/envext.nsf/46ParentDoc/ClimateChange?OpenDocument>)

In the fourth year, we will evaluate the impact of the identified PPP. We finalize the reports and present the findings to audiences in China, Brazil, and India. In addition, we intend to have two finished dissertation projects at the end of this phase.

Work schedule	2006	2007	2008	2009
Mapping of CDM projects in China, India, and Brazil Preparation of interview questionnaire				
Interviews with IOs, NGOs, and business actors				
Analysis of conditions of success Milestone I: draft article				
Preparation of field studies in cooperation with local research institutes (start of documentary analysis)				
Field research in India, China, and Brazil (interviews and documentary research)				
Analysis of field research; coding of data				
Writing of reports and presentation of results in the countries Milestone II: final report and two dissertations				

During the *second phase* of the *SFB*, we will move toward systematic hypothesis-testing with regard to the actual impact, effectiveness, and problem-solving capacity of CDM on the ground. In this context, we will check our set of hypotheses against the working hypotheses of other PPP projects with a view of possibly integrating our project more closely with other *SFB* projects (see framework paper).

Moreover, we intend to focus on two sets of research which will allow us to gain better theoretical explanations for the analyzed new forms of *governance*. First, we will examine whether private business actors and multilateral organizations have started to cooperate in areas with limited statehood which have an even weaker state capacity in the field of environmental policy making, and which, so far, have not been identified as key players in the climate protection regime (possible cases include Uganda and Indonesia). These cases will show whether CDM and similar mechanisms are subject to global diffusion or are only of interest for a certain group of countries. Second, we will investigate whether critical countries (i.e. the regional powers we analyzed in the first phase) have an impact on neighboring countries and their respective modes of *environmental governance*. Such processes, in fact, would be in line with patterns of South-East Asia's industrial modernization and export orientation during the 1970s and 1980s, with front-runners (such as Japan and Korea) being copied and followed successfully by second generation reformers (such as Thailand and Indonesia). Copying modes of *governance* that have proven to work may, one can argue, be fully rational given learning costs and the need for upfront investments. Copying and transferring may also be in line with hypotheses of technological policy diffusion, but now starting from non-OECD (!) countries. With the Kyoto Protocol's first phase ending in 2012, we expect such effects to be detectable towards the end of the *SFB*'s first phase.

For the *third phase* of the *SFB*, we would re-check the dynamics of PPP in previously selected and new case studies to elaborate the structural consequences these institutional arrangements have for global environmental policies. The main research question would be related to the issue of sustainability of environmental PPP, a question we addressed already, but with less emphasis, in the first phase. We ask which types of PPP are just temporary or transitory arrangements, which are more permanent, and what makes the difference. Which types of countries (with low state capacity) are more apt to need certain types of PPP; or which kind of environmental public goods need what kind of PPP? Yet, there is a limited amount of market-ready environmental goods, there may be cultural differences on what may be accepted within societies, and markets do not automatically address concerns of legitimacy.

3.5 Stellung innerhalb des Sonderforschungsbereichs

Das Projekt ist Teil des Projektbereichs D „Wohlfahrt und Umwelt“. Es generiert Hypothesen zu den Bedingungen, unter denen international tätige Firmen im Umweltbereich eine aktive Rolle einnehmen. Ferner wenden wir uns analytisch der Frage zu, welche Konsequenzen ein solches Engagement hat und ob letzteres zu einem Einfordern institutioneller Arrangements führt – und letztlich damit in den Partnerländern inkrementell zu einer Bereitstellung OECD-typischer öffentlicher Güter. Das Projekt schließt damit sehr gut an die anderen Vorhaben im Projektbereich D an, die entweder eine ähnliche Rolle privater wirtschaftlicher Akteure in anderen Sektoren vermuten (D2 Börzel/Héritier) oder aber ebenfalls auf die Frage eingehen, unter welchen Bedingungen bzw. innerhalb welcher institutioneller Arrangements die Einbindung privater Akteure erfolgversprechend ist (D1 Risse/Beisheim sowie D4 Enderlein). Die genannten Projekte werden sich nicht nur innerhalb des Projektbereich D miteinander austauschen, sondern auch in der geplanten Querschnittsgruppe „Theoretische Reflexion von *Governance* und ‚neuen‘ Formen des Regierens“, wo wir unter anderem untersuchen werden, inwieweit für all diese Projekte ein gleichartiger Hypothesenkatalog für die zweite und dritte Phase entwickelt werden kann. Auf Länderebene findet sich eine Überschneidung mit dem Projekt D5 Leutner, das ebenfalls (allerdings historisch) auf China ausgerichtet ist. Hier wird zu fragen sein, inwieweit die heute entstehenden Partnerschaften zwischen Privatakteuren und Internationalen Organisationen in einem länderspezifischem Kontext zu verstehen sind.

Wir unterscheiden uns von den genannten Teilprojekten in dreierlei Hinsicht:

(1) Während D1 Risse/Beisheim und D2 Börzel/Héritier PPP eher als institutionalisierte Formen der öffentlich-privaten Zusammenarbeit verstehen, untersuchen wir, ähnlich wie D4 Enderlein, eher lose (und temporär funktionale) Kooperationsformen und Allianzen. Es wird innerhalb der dialogischen Querschnittsgruppe des SFB zu klären sein, ob dieser niedrige Institutionalisierungsgrad von Vorteil oder Nachteil für die Zielerreichung der PPP ist.

(2) Während D1 Risse/Beisheim seine Arbeitshypothesen aus den Theorien der internationalen Beziehungen heraus gewinnt und D2 Börzel/Héritier den Schwerpunkt auf Europäisierungslite-

ratur und Analysen zur Regulierung setzt, ist der Ausgangspunkt unseres Teilprojekts verwaltungswissenschaftlich bzw. speist sich aus der entwicklungspolitischen Diskussion und der zugehörigen Debatte zum Wandel von Staatlichkeit.

(3) D2 Börzel/Héritier analysiert den Einfluss privatwirtschaftlicher Akteure in verschiedenen Sektoren in einem Land. Wir hingegen untersuchen die gleiche Thematik in einem Politikbereich über verschiedene Länder hinweg. Die Debatte, inwieweit wissenschaftlich interessante Varianz eher auf der Ebene der Politikbereiche oder auf der Ebene des Untersuchungsraumes gefunden wird, kann somit zwischen den beiden Projekten aufgegriffen werden. Weiterhin unterscheiden wir uns auch *empirisch* von den genannten Teilprojekten. Zwar werden auch in D1 Risse/Beisheim und D2 Börzel/Héritier Fragen der Umweltpolitik aufgegriffen, aber diese Themen stehen dort nicht im Zentrum. In unserem Projekt wird zusätzlich stärker als in allen anderen die Möglichkeit in Betracht gezogen, dass die entstehenden (v.a. die erfolgreichen) PPP sich selber überflüssig machen – und ab einem gewissen Zeitpunkt die sich herausbildenden *Governance*-Strukturen marktförmigen Charakter erhalten (und schließlich aus dem engeren öffentlichen Sektor herauswachsen).

Aufgabenbeschreibung von Mitarbeitern der Grundausrüstung für die beantragte Förderperiode

Wissenschaftliche Mitarbeiter/innen (einschließlich Hilfskräfte)

1. Prof. Dr. Harald Fuhr (C4) ist mit 6 Wochenstunden am Teilprojekt beteiligt. Seine Aufgaben umfassen die allgemeine Leitung und Koordination des Teilprojekts. Er ist ferner insbesondere für die Kontakte zu Internationalen Organisationen, den Partnerinstituten in Brasilien, Indien und China verantwortlich.
2. Dr. Markus Lederer (WiMi) ist mit 10 Wochenstunden am Teilprojekt beteiligt. Seine Aufgaben umfassen Leitungsfunktionen mit Blick auf die Erstellung der Fallstudien.
3. Studentische Hilfskraft N.N. ist für Recherche sowie die Planung der Reisen verantwortlich.

Nichtwissenschaftliche Mitarbeiter/innen

1. Frau Marion Dräger (BAT VIb O) wird im Rahmen von 4 Wochenstunden verschiedene Verwaltungs- und Schreibaufgaben erledigen.

Aufgabenbeschreibung von Mitarbeitern der Ergänzungsausstattung für die beantragte Förderperiode

Wissenschaftliche Mitarbeiter/innen (einschließlich Hilfskräfte)

1. N.N. (BAT Iia/halbe Ost) ist mit 20 Wochenstunden am Teilprojekt beteiligt. Seine/Ihre Aufgaben umfassen die Fallstudie China.

2. N.N. (BAT IIa/halbe Ost) ist mit 20 Wochenstunden am Teilprojekt beteiligt. Seine/Ihre Aufgaben umfassen die Fallstudie Brasilien.
3. N.N. (BAT IIa/halbe Ost) ist mit 20 Wochenstunden am Teilprojekt beteiligt. Er/sie wird die Fallstudie Indien bearbeiten.
4. Studentische Hilfskraft N.N. ist als studentische Hilfskraft mit 10 Wochenstunden für die Unterstützung der Fallstudienarbeit vorgesehen.

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