External Authority

Compensation for Limited Statehood in the Provision of Collective Goods?

Luisa Linke-Behrens and Lisa van Hoof-Maurer
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Luisa Linke-Behrens and Lisa van Hoof-Maurer

Abstract:
The vast majority of areas of limited statehood are subject to the authority of external actors, be it the IMF or regional organizations. These actors typically provide authority structures – institutions and rules – that are complementary or alternative to the state’s domestic authority structures. It is reasonable to assume that these external actors may either deliver collective goods directly, or the authority structures provided by them might work indirectly to that effect. In this paper, we systematically investigate whether external authority compensates for limited statehood with regard to collective goods provision. Our analysis shows that this is not the case. On the contrary, in fragile states with extremely limited or even absent statehood, the presence of external authority in domestic authority structures seems to have the opposite effect and is associated with poor collective goods provision.

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1. Introduction

The vast majority of areas of limited statehood are subject to external authority. Many are constrained by loan conditionality of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) or the World Bank, others are members of regional organizations with binding laws. Some are under the authority of peace and stabilization missions. In this context, external authority is understood as the legitimate constraint of a state’s freedom of action by an external actor. This actor then typically provides authority structures – institutions and rules – that are complementary or alternative to the state’s domestic authority structures. Think of the conditionality of the IMF with regard to loans to Argentina in the 2001 financial crisis. These loans were tied to comprehensive institutional reform and the adoption of specific legislation, severely restricting the Argentinian government’s room to maneuver compared to a situation in which it could pass legislation and reform – exercise authority over its territory – according to its own will. It is reasonable to assume that such external authority is positively associated with collective goods delivery: external actors with such authority may either deliver collective goods directly (cf. Matanock 2014), or the authority structures provided by them might work indirectly to that effect. In this paper, we systematically investigate this argument by asking: To what extent can external authority compensate for limited statehood with regard to collective goods provision? Our analysis shows that external authority cannot compensate for a lack of statehood when it comes to collective goods delivery. On the contrary, in fragile states with extremely limited or even absent statehood, the presence of external authority in domestic authority structures seems to have the opposite effect and is associated with poor collective goods provision.

With this research we extend a prominent line of inquiry examining the relationship between statehood and authority on the one side and governance provision on the other. Whereas some claim that more services will be provided where the state is strong (Rotberg 2003, 2004, 2013), others oppose this view and suggest that governance can be provided even where the state is weak or absent (Beisheim et al. 2011; Risse 2011b, 2015). Much scholarly effort has been devoted to the analysis of functional equivalents that provide governance, especially external actors from the international and transnational realm (see for example Beisheim/Campe 2012; Börzel et al. 2012; Börzel/van Hüllen 2015; Krasner/Risse 2014b; Liese/Beisheim 2011; Schäferhoff 2011, 2013). While we build on this body of work, we are specifically interested in those external actors that exercise authority and intrude into the authority structures of the target state.

We identify three types of external authority that can meaningfully interfere with domestic authority structures: territorial intervention, legal authority of regional or international organizations, and conditionality. Interference by a UN-mandated mission, such as in the Democratic Republic of Congo, is territorial in nature and therefore quite distinct from the non-territorial authorities of law and conditionality. Even though the latter are both concerned with interference, we contend that their quality is different and ought to be distinguished. These three categories form the basis of an original dataset of external authority. Our analysis relies in addition on comprehensive, country-level data for consolidated, weak, and fragile states for...
the year 2008 including data on collective goods provision in five sectors (basic subsistence, education, infrastructure, public health, security) assembled by Lee et al. (2014).

The argument develops in four steps. The next section starts by defining key concepts before presenting the theoretical links between authority and collective goods provision. Section three continues by describing operationalization and data sources, while section four demonstrates the results of the correlation analysis. We evaluate our findings and conclude in section five.

2. Conceptual Considerations

In the following, we first define the main concepts: collective goods, statehood, and external authority. We then advance theoretical considerations on the relations between authority and collective goods provision. In distinguishing between statehood and external authority, we draw on the concept of sovereignty proposed by Stephen Krasner (1999, 2009). Domestic sovereignty and Westphalian sovereignty involve notions of internal and external authority, respectively. While we choose to refer directly to authority instead of taking a detour via sovereignty, Krasner’s work remains a conceptual reference point throughout the next paragraphs.

2.1 Definitions: Collective Goods, Statehood and External Authority

We understand collective goods – as opposed to private goods – as an immediate output of governance (cf. Draude et al. 2012). The latter is defined as “institutionalized modes of social coordination to produce and implement collectively binding rules, or to provide collective goods” (Draude et al. 2012; for similar definitions, see Mayntz 2004; Risse 2011a: 9; Schuppert/ Zürn 2008). This definition overcomes the implicit Western/Eurocentric bias of most governance definitions, which sharply distinguish between the private and public realms and equate statehood with modern consolidated nation-statehood. Accordingly, our definition is able to account for the blurred lines between private and public spheres in most non-OECD countries and takes into account governance independent from and beyond consolidated statehood (Draude 2012; Risse 2011a).

(Political) authority is a form of power; more specifically it entails the constraint of A’s freedom of action by B. As opposed to coercion, authority implies that B is legitimized (authorized) to restrict the freedom of A (cf. Lake 2013; Simmons 2012). Such a conception of authority always contains a notion of hierarchical command, either within a given community (for example, a state) or in the international system. In the international realm, authority is derived from two main sources: law and social contract.¹ Accordingly, one can distinguish two main forms of authority: formal-legal and relational authority (Lake 2009, 2013). With formal-legal authority, B earns the right to command all subordinates A by the lawful position it holds; in relational authority, B “provides a political order of value to […] [A] sufficient to offset the loss of freedom

¹ Lake draws on notions of sources of legitimate authority formulated by Weber (1978). Besides law and social contract, Weber mentions tradition and charismatic (leadership) as sources of legitimate authority.
incurred in subordination” (Lake 2013: 59). Formal-legal authority, Lake (2013) claims, does not exist in international relations, as there is no law above states in an anarchical system. We argue, on the contrary, that there are instances of formal-legal authority where international institutions are able to exercise command over the subordinated states, such as regional organizations with binding law. Independent of its source, authority structures the behavior of individuals or states by providing the means to sanction non-compliance to given rules.

External authority, although widely used as a term in the discipline of International Relations, is only poorly theorized at a structural level. Most studies rely on agency-centered models, even if they claim to do otherwise (e.g., Lake/Fariss 2014). We understand external authority, as mentioned above, as a legitimate form of power: the legitimate constraint of the freedom of action of state A by external actor B. Actor B may offer authority structures complementary or alternative to A’s domestic authority structures; the operational basis of B is located outside of A. Three types of external authority seem relevant, as mentioned in the introduction: territorial interventions, legal authority, and conditionality. Whereas legal authority clearly relates only to formal-legal sources, territorial interventions and conditionality might derive authority from formal-legal as well as relational sources. If territorial interventions are mandated by the UN (Security Council) or a regional organization with supranational law, the associated authority derives from a legal source, but the interventions are of a relational nature if carried out without a formal mandate. The same differentiation can be made for conditionality. It might represent an instance of formal-legal authority in the case of lending conditionality by the IMF, but one of relational authority when large amounts of foreign currency are kept by a certain state, as this state might exert power over the owner of the currency.

Statehood relates to the formal organization of domestic authority structures and their effectiveness. Risse (2011a: 9) defines statehood as the ability to make and enforce central political decisions (Herrschaftsverband) and control over the means of violence (Gewaltenmonopol). Statehood entails a notion of internal authority, namely of the state and its government institutions over its subjects, both in the relational and the formal-legal sense. Territorial, sectoral, social, and temporal areas where the state's ability to rule is restricted are called areas of limited statehood (Risse 2011a: 4-5).

2.2 How Statehood and External Authority Relate to Collective Goods Provision

The relationship between statehood and external authority on the one side and governance and collective goods provision on the other remains under-researched from a theoretical perspective. However, there are three classical arguments on why and when the state provides collective goods for its citizens (cf. Lee et al. 2014: 2-3): Social contract theory holds that individuals cede certain rights to the state in exchange for the provision of collective goods, notably collective security (Boucher/Kelly 1994; Hobbes 1651/1955). Welfare economists argue that the state should provide goods that suffer from market failure (Samuelson 1954). Finally, in a functionalist argument on output legitimacy, the ruled people offers legitimacy and compliance to the ruling state if the state delivers a socio-political order acceptable to the ruled (Lake 2009). Yet these arguments
assume that consolidated statehood is the necessary condition for collective goods provision, and therefore they cannot hold true in many non-OECD countries where statehood is severely limited: if state authorities do not possess a monopoly of force, they cannot establish public security; if they are unable to make and enforce rules, they may fail to extract the financial resources needed to provide collective goods.

Alternative arguments challenge this assumption of linearity and suggest that low levels of statehood do not necessarily relate to low levels of collective goods provision. They claim that effective governance provision mainly relies on a “shadow of hierarchy” (Börzel/Risse 2010; Risse 2011b, 2013b) and that “consolidated statehood is a prominent […] but not the only way to generate [such] a shadow’ (Risse 2013a: 89). So-called functional equivalents can compensate for limited statehood; one example is an external shadow of hierarchy, or external authority that provides alternative authority structures or complements existing domestic authority structures (cf. Krasner 2005: 7, on shared sovereignty). The effect on governance is two-fold: external actors with such authority may either directly deliver governance, in analogy to provision by a state, or external authority may work indirectly by providing alternative structures necessary for effective governance provision.

Different studies analyze ways in which external authority is used to improve public goods provision where the state is weak. Matanock (2014) has described the role of external authority in fostering and complementing existing domestic authority structures. Lake/Fariss (2014) have analyzed the effect of external alternative authority structures for neo-trusteeships as examples of a direct provision of collective goods by external actors using external authority. Other scholars have studied the indirect effect of external authority as described above (Börzel et al. 2012; Krasner/Risse 2014a; Schäferhoff 2011, 2013). These studies adopt an actor-centric perspective looking at actors commanding external authority, in contrast to this paper’s structural approach.

3. Operationalization and Data

This section discusses the operationalization, measurement, and data selection for each variable. But first, we wish to address one major criticism of nationally aggregated data, namely methodological nationalism (Zürn 2002). Such a dataset gives the false impression that the state or external authority is equally present throughout the whole territory and that the entire population benefits from equal levels of collective goods provision. At the same time, the analysis excludes political entities that are not internationally recognized. This is highly problematic, but no viable solution offers itself at this point; all that remains is to use the existing data while bearing in mind the implications at the later stage of the analysis.

3.1 Collective Goods

Given that the analysis uses the dataset provided by Lee et al. (2014), the following explanations are rather short; please refer to the original source for more details. Note that we measure the
output associated with collective goods, not the delivery itself, and we do not account for the actors who provided these goods. All data is categorized as high (marked green in table 1 below), medium (orange) and low (red).

Basic subsistence is conceptualized as the percentage of the population with access to an improved water source, with data from the World Development Indicators (World Bank 2015). Education is operationalized as the average number of years of schooling that a child at the age of school entrance can expect to receive. We employ data from UNESCO (2015). Infrastructure is proxied by electricity rate; that is, the proportion of the population with electricity access at the household level. We use World Energy Outlook data from the International Energy Agency (International Energy Agency 2011). Public Health is measured by the maternal mortality rate, defined as the number of deaths of mothers during pregnancy or within the first 42 days after giving birth. Data comes from the University of Washington's Institute for Health Metrics and Evaluation (Hogan et al. 2010). We understand security as citizen-centric security, and it is measured by the absence of violence leading to death, including one-sided violence by the state or non-state organized groups against private individuals, violence by private individuals against other individuals (homicide), between the state and organized non-state groups (internal armed conflict), and between non-state organized groups. Data is compiled from Schröder and the Uppsala Conflict Data Project (Eck/Hultman 2007; Eck et al. 2010; Schröder 2010; UCDP 2011).

3.2 External Authority and Statehood

Given that formal-legal authority is more institutionalized than relational authority, it is possible to measure it much more precisely than its relational counterpart. We therefore focus on formal-legal authority in the following operationalization of external authority and its three dimensions without meaning to diminish the importance of relational authority.

**Territorial interventions** cover physical coercion and non-military interventions. This includes inter-state wars and bi- or multilateral interventions with a legal basis, such as military interventions by regional organizations, UN political operations, coalitions of states with a UN mandate, and peace-keeping missions either led by the UN or regional organizations or conducted by a group of states with a mandate from the UN Security Council. Note that observation missions are not part of this category, and only operations with more than 100 staff members are coded. Although this demarcation line seems arbitrary, we need to account for larger missions in command of larger resources, which has been mentioned in the literature (Krasner/Risse 2014a) as an important factor of success. Data is derived from the SIPRI Yearbook 2009 and the SIPRI Multilateral Peace Operations Database (Harbom/Wallenstein 2009; Soder 2009).

**Legal authority** is commanded by international or regional organizations with binding supranational law and the possibility to enforce it, for example by means of a supranational court issuing rulings that are binding for all member states. Note that this provision does not require the supremacy of supranational law over national laws, such as in the EU. We have coded
original data on legal authority. The dataset includes members of the EU, ECOWAS, the South African Development Community (SADC), the Caribbean Community (CARICOM), and the Andean Community (CAN) (CAN 2011a, 2011b; CARICOM Secretariat 2011; CCJ 2012; ECOWAS Commission 2007; European Commission 2012; SADC 2012).

**Conditionality** includes legal conditionality – sanctions and rewards with a legal basis such as membership conditionality in the EU – and lending/economic conditionality, most importantly by the International Monetary Fund (IMF) or the World Bank. Data comes from progress reports of the European Commission of 2009 (European Commission 2009), the IMF’s Monitoring of Fund Arrangements Database (MONA) (IMF 2014), and the World Bank lending database (World Bank 2014).

*Statehood* is operationalized as control over the legitimate means of violence and the ability to make and enforce collectively binding decisions. We categorize all states in one of three groups: consolidated, weak, and fragile states. This builds on a scale developed by Börzel/Risse (2013: 71), but we replace their label “areas of limited statehood” with “weak states.” Risse (2011a) has himself argued that areas of limited statehood can also exist within consolidated states, and using the term with reference to both fragile and consolidated states therefore seems conceptually imprecise. Data for the monopoly of force is composed of the degree to which the state can effectively maintain authoritative order (MAGFAIL) and the proportion of a country affected by revolutionary protest and fighting (MAGAREA); these measures are derived from the Political Instability Task Force Database of the Center of Global Policy at George Mason University (Lee et al. 2014: 5). The ability to make and enforce collectively binding decisions is proxied by the ability to extract resources for the purpose of producing public goods and services, that is, extractive capacity. Data is derived from the Institutional Profile Database of the Centre d’Etudes Prospectives et d’Informations Internationales (cf. Lee et al. 2014).

The sample comprises 122 states in the year 2008. We mapped the governance performance of all states in tables – a table for each collective good – with levels of statehood in columns, and types of external authority in rows. The different levels of governance are indicated through colors: green for high governance provision, orange for medium, and red for low.

### 4. External Authority: Compensation for Limited Statehood?

Before discussing collective goods provision in light of external authority and statehood, it is worth looking at the distribution of external authority and statehood on their own (see table 1). Overall, about five in six states are constrained by external authority. However, the presence of external authority in domestic structures is more common among weak and fragile states than among consolidated states. Roughly two in three fragile and weak states are subject to some kind of external authority. The few exceptions include most Gulf states such as Qatar, Bahrain,

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Note that we excluded the fourth category of the original scale, failed states, due to the small sample size.
Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates, together with Israel, Libya and Russia. In other words, weak or fragile states that are not bound by external authority are the exception. The ratio is much lower among consolidated states, of which only about half are bound by external authority.

Table 1: Statehood, external authority, and health

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type of external authority</th>
<th>Conditionality</th>
<th>Legal</th>
<th>Territorial</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>No</td>
<td>Cambodia, Laos, Nepal, Pakistan, Philippines, Sri Lanka, Ukraine, Uzbekistan, Yemen, Guatemala</td>
<td>Angola, Indonesia, Nigeria, Tanzania, Zimbabwe, Sudan</td>
<td>Central African Republic, Chad, Côte d’Ivoire, DRC, Ethiopia, Lebanon, Syria</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Legal</td>
<td>Algeria, Argentina, Azerbaijan, Bangladesh, Brazil, Cameroon, China, Congo, Dominican Republic, Egypt, Gabon, Ghana, Honduras, India, Iran, Jordan, Kazakhstan, Kenya, Malaysia, Mauritania, Mexico, Mongolia, Morocco, Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, Serbia, Thailand, Tunisia, Turkey, Uganda, Uruguay, Vietnam</td>
<td>Benin, Botswana, Bulgaria, Burkina Faso, Colombia, Ecuador, Greece, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Madagascar, Mali, Mauritius, Mozambique, Namibia, Niger, Peru, Portugal, Romania, Senegal, Togo, Zambia</td>
<td>Cyprus, Haiti</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Territorial</td>
<td>Austrian, Bahrain, Belgium, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Hungary, Ireland, Malta, Netherlands, Poland, Slovakia, Slovenia, South Africa, Spain, Sweden, UK</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Almost half of all states are situated in the middle of the table: they are weak states and subject to either conditionality or legal authority or both. There are very few weak states in the lowest row; in other words, territorial interventions in weak states seem to occur only rarely. Fragile states are, with the exceptions mentioned earlier, equally affected by all three types of external authority with a slight tendency toward conditionality. Finally, there are virtually no consolidated
states bound only by conditionality or with a territorial intervention on their territory. Most consolidated states are under the legal authority of a regional organization – these are, above all, the members of the European Union – while the rest is subject to no external authority.

If indeed external authority could compensate for limited statehood, what would we expect in terms of the distribution of collective goods provision? We would think that fragile states with no interference by external authority perform worse than fragile states that are subject to external authority, especially territorial interventions. We would see red and orange in the upper cell of the column for fragile states in table 1, and green and orange in the lower cells, or at least a mix of colors throughout the column. The same would be true for weak states.

Table 1 above demonstrates the results for public health; the tables for security, education, basic subsistence and infrastructure can be found in the annex. A look at these tables reveals that none of the above expectations seem to be the case. In fact, we see an entirely different pattern. First, collective goods provision is better in states that are not subject to any external authority, regardless of the level of statehood. This is observable in the area of health and in all other sectors. Second, fragile states subject to territorial interventions or legal authority perform weakly in the provision of governance, again throughout all sectors. Conditionality is related to mixed governance performance in fragile states. For example, public health performance is equally insufficient in Nigeria – subject to the legal authority of ECOWAS – as in the Central African Republic, which is host to the Multidimensional Stabilization Mission. Third, in weak states, where state authorities remain at least partially in control, no clear connection is discernible between the type of external authority and the level of collective goods delivery. Well-performing countries such as Argentina, Brazil, Peru, or Portugal can be found in either category of external authority. Likewise, poorly performing states such as Cameroon, Mauretania, Mali, or Niger are situated in both categories. Health performance is equally good in Russia, which is subject to no external authority, as in Peru, a member of the Andean Community with binding regional law; it is equally bad in Cameroon, bound to conditionality by the IMF, as in Zambia, member of SADC and subject to its legal authority. Lastly, different types of territorial intervention seem to make a difference: countries with a peace-keeping mission in place such as Lebanon or Cyprus perform much better across sectors than countries with military missions on their territory. This includes the Central African Republic or Chad, whose governance performance is low in all sectors.

5. Evaluation and Conclusion

Our analysis demonstrates that external authority does not necessarily improve governance provision in areas of limited statehood. It seems that external authority cannot compensate for limited statehood when it comes to the provision of collective goods and services, quite contrary to our initial expectation. External authority does not seem to be systematically associated with high levels of collective goods provision. In fact, collective goods provision is better in states that are not subject to any external authority, regardless of the level of statehood. This trend is most clearly the case in fragile states, where all types of external authority are associated with
lower levels of collective goods provision; in weak states, this is not as markedly visible. In other words, neither statehood nor external authority is as directly related to collective goods provision as commonly assumed.

Two explanations might explain these results. First, the shadow of external authority might not be sufficiently strong to have a large-scale effect on collective goods provision. In this case, the authority structures provided by external actors are either not functional or not utilized to improve collective goods provision. Second, the external actors in possession of authority might not provide collective goods on a scale that would be visible in macro data. These explanations can work independent of each other or can function simultaneously; in any case, the authority exercised by these external actors does not seem to make a difference when it comes to collective goods provision.

The findings of this analysis are interesting in themselves, but they invite a host of open questions. In addition, they should be considered with an awareness of the empirical shortcomings. To offset these deficiencies and to assess the proposed relations between external authority, statehood, and collective goods provision in more depth, we suggest the following case study approaches: A first idea is to investigate the qualitative differences of the various types of external authority as proposed above. Holding the levels of statehood constant at a low level, this type of study could compare fragile states subject to external authority in terms of the reasons for submitting to such authority, the character of such authority, and finally, the (non)effects of that authority on collective goods provision. An additional perspective would be offered by a comparison of states subject to the same type of external authority with different levels of statehood. What are the relations to governance performance? Once again, are there different rationalities for the subordination to external authority? What are the relations between statehood and external authority? A third interesting topic is the group of consolidated states that are not bound by any kind of external authority. Aside from economic wealth, what are the reasons for this status? What role do notions of sovereignty and autonomy play? And finally, it would be worthwhile to look more closely at the difference in collective goods provision between countries subject to peace-keeping missions and those subject to military interventions.
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## Annex

### Table 2: Statehood, external authority, and security

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type of external authority</th>
<th>Statehood</th>
<th>Legal authority (or: legal + cond.)</th>
<th>Territorial intervention</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>No</td>
<td>Low: Fragile States: Qatar, United Arab Emirates, Bahrain</td>
<td>Laos, Guatemala, Nepal, Pakistan, Philippines, Sri Lanka, Ukraine, Uzbekistan, Yemen</td>
<td>Central African Republic, Chad, Côte d'Ivoire, DRC, Ethiopia, Lebanon, Syria</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Med: Weak States: Israel, Kuwait, Libya, Russia, Saudi Arabia, Venezuela</td>
<td>Algeria, Argentina, Azerbaijan, Bangladesh, Brazil, Cameroon, China, Congo, Dominican Republic, Egypt, Gabon, Ghana, India, Iran, Jordan, Kazakhstan, Kenya, Malaysia, Mauritania, Mexico, Mongolia, Morocco, Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, Thailand, Tunisia, Turkey, Uganda, Uruguay, Vietnam</td>
<td>Cyprus, Haiti</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>High: consolidated States: Australia, Canada, Chile, Cuba, Japan, South Korea, New Zealand, Norway, Oman, Singapore, Switzerland, US</td>
<td>Angola, Indonesia, Nigeria, Tanzania, Zimbabwe, Sudan,</td>
<td>Austria, Bahrain, Belgium, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Hungary, Ireland, Malta, Netherlands, Poland, Slovakia, Slovenia, South Africa, Spain, Sweden, UK</td>
</tr>
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Table 3: Statehood, external authority, and basic subsistence

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type of external authority</th>
<th>Statehood</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>No</td>
<td>Low: Fragile States</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conditionality</td>
<td>Qatar, United Arab Emirates</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Legal authority (or: legal + cond.)</td>
<td>Cambodia, Guatemala, Laos, Nepal, Pakistan, Philippines, Sri Lanka, Ukraine, Uzbekistan, Yemen</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Territorial intervention</td>
<td>Angola, Indonesia, Nigeria, Tanzania, Zimbabwe, Sudan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Central African Republic, Chad, Côte d'Ivoire, DRC, Ethiopia, Lebanon, Syria</td>
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</table>
Table 4: Statehood, external authority, and infrastructure

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type of external authority</th>
<th>Low: Fragile States</th>
<th>Med: Weak States</th>
<th>High: consolidated States</th>
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<tr>
<td>No</td>
<td>Qatar, United Arab</td>
<td>Israel, Kuwait,</td>
<td>Australia, Canada, Chile,</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Emirates, Bahrain</td>
<td>Russia, Libya,</td>
<td>Cuba, Japan, South Korea,</td>
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<td>Saudi-Arabia,</td>
<td>New Zealand, Norway,</td>
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<td>Oman, Singapore,</td>
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<td>Laos, Nepal, Pakistan,</td>
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<td>Uruguay, Vietnam</td>
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<td>Conditionality</td>
<td>Angola, Indonesia, Nigeria, Tanzania, Zimbabwe, Sudan</td>
<td>Benin, Bolivia, Botswana, Bulgaria, Burkina Faso, Colombia, Ecuador, Greece, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Madagascar, Mauritius, Mozambique, Namibia, Peru, Portugal, Romania, Senegal, Togo, Zambia</td>
<td>Austria, Belgium, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Hungary, Ireland, Netherlands, Poland, Slovakia, Slovenia, South Africa, Spain, Sweden, UK</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Legal authority (or: legal + cond.)</td>
<td>Côte d'Ivoire, DRC, Ethiopia, Lebanon, Syria</td>
<td>Haiti</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Territorial intervention</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 5: Statehood, external authority, and education

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type of external authority</th>
<th>Statehood</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>No</td>
<td>Low: Fragile States Qatar, United Arab Emirates, Bahrain</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Med: Weak States Israel, Kuwait, Russia, Libya, Saudi-Arabia, Venezuela</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>High: consolidated States Australia, Canada, Chile, Cuba, Japan, South Korea, New Zealand, Norway, Oman, Singapore, Switzerland, US</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conditionality</td>
<td>Cambodia, Guatemala, Laos, Nepal, Pakistan, Philippines, Sri Lanka, Ukraine, Uzbekistan, Yemen</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Algeria, Argentina, Azerbaijan, Bangladesh, Brazil, Cameroon, China, Congo, Dominican Republic, Egypt, Gabon, Ghana, Honduras, India, Iran, Jordan, Kazakhstan, Kenya, Malaysia, Mauretania, Mexico, Mongolia, Morocco, Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, Serbia, Thailand, Tunisia, Turkey, Uganda, Uruguay, Vietnam</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Legal authority</td>
<td>Angola, Indonesia, Nigeria, Tanzania, Zimbabwe, Sudan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(or: legal + cond.)</td>
<td>Benin, Bolivia, Botswana, Bulgaria, Burkina Faso, Colombia, Ecuador, Greece, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Madagascar, Mali, Mauritius, Mozambique, Namibia, Niger, Peru, Portugal, Romania, Senegal, Togo, Zambia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Territorial intervention</td>
<td>Central African Republic, Chad, Côte d’Ivoire, DRC, Ethiopia, Lebanon, Syria</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Cyprus, Haiti</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
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Governance has become a central theme in social science research. The Collaborative Research Center (SFB) 700 Governance in Areas of Limited Statehood investigates governance in areas of limited statehood, i.e. developing countries, failing and failed states, as well as, in historical perspective, different types of colonies. How and under what conditions can governance deliver legitimate authority, security, and welfare, and what problems are likely to emerge?

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