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Research Questions

1. What factors explain variances in the effectiveness of territorial control and the corresponding provision of basic security services in areas of limited statehood?

2. What are the consequences for statehood and for the territories themselves? What territorial and conflict constellations emerge from the observable forms of security and force and from competing claims to territorial control – and what theoretical conclusions can we draw?

In order to answer these questions, project C2 investigates structural opportunities and actor configurations in terms of their potential for conflict dynamics and positive externalities for statehood and security.

In doing so, the project identifies ways in which competing (and also new) forms of territorial control either undermine or aid in the development of new statehood.


Project Team







Implementation



Graphic 1: Operational areas of the main violent actors in Somalia, 2008–2009 (Chojnacki et al. 2013)

Forms of violent action and their consequences for statehood

We evaluate the effectiveness of statehood based on the quality of security services provided (increase/decrease of reciprocal violence, one-sided violence against the civilian population) as well as on the spatiotemporal scope of those services.

The C2 project categorizes violence according to six functions/characteristics:

- 1. Reciprocal violence in order to control/defend a territory (political and material basis of authority)
- 2. Reciprocal violence in order to control a territory (access to and control of resources and infrastructure)
- 3. One-sided violence in order to control social relationships within a defined area
- 4. One-sided violence as a marker of weak territorial control5. One-sided violence as an opportunistic strategy
- 6. One-sided or reciprocal violence as an expression of individual motivations and chance opportunities (violence outside of the conflict's actual context)

Our analysis is based on two databases:

- Event Data on Armed Conflict and Security (EDACS)
- Private Security Database (PSD)

EDACS contains data on spatiotemporally disaggregated violent events, while PSD aggregates contract relationships between private and public actors delegating security services to commercial security and military firms in failing and failed states. Both datasets are available online using a project-specific data platform: www.conflict-data.org.

Variances in enforcing territorial control

Variances in the effective enforcement of territorial control depend on actor constellations, military and economic resources, and trigger factors, for example the deployment of military firms, the collapse of the state military, and peace negotiations.

Our analysis of variances in territorial control also relies on contextualizing violent actors' areas of operation using geographical information on infrastructure (streets and waterways), topography (forests, fields, etc.), and the availability of resources.

Example


In Somalia we can observe that the constellation of territory and actors has led to a partial reconsolidation of territorial rule on a sub-state level. In northern and central Somalia (Graphic 1), non-state violent actors exercise territorial control over limited areas for limited periods of time, varying in stability, effectiveness, and scope.

Statehood and the (re)structuring of territory

The different spatiotemporal forms of territorial control have certain consequences for areas of limited statehood. Especially relevant on a theoretical level is the dual problematic that different areas of limited statehood (co)exist and produce a complex interplay among the establishment of territory, the use of force, and the presence or lack of security. With this in mind, the C2 project will systematically assess the significance of newly drawn borders – within or beyond the state – for future security measures.

Contribution to the SFB 700

First, project C2 contributes to identifying conditions for successful security governance. Second, we try to determine the consequences of competing forms of territorial control and interventions by state actors (internal or external) for statehood and for the territories themselves.



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