

Assessing the Contribution of International Actors in Afghanistan

Results from a Representative Survey

Jan Koehler/Christoph Zürcher



SFB-GOVERNANCE WORKING PAPER SERIES • No. 7 • OCTOBER 2007

Content

Executive Summary	3
Assessing the contribution of international actors in Afghanistan	5
Data	5
Security	5
Development aid	7
Western vs. traditional values	9
How respondents see the state	9
How respondents see the community	11
Sub-regional differences	12
Causal impact of development aid	13
Appendix	14
Measuring aid: A note on the statistical analysis	14
Regression table	19
Map	20

Koehler, Jan/Zürcher, Christoph 2007: Assessing the Contribution of International Actors in Afghanistan. Results from a Representative Survey, SFB-Governance Working Paper Series, No. 7, DFG Research Center (SFB) 700, Berlin, October 2007.

ISSN 1863-6896 (Print)

ISSN 1864-1024 (Internet)

This publication has been funded by the German Research Foundation (DFG).

DFG Research Center (SFB) 700
 Freie Universität Berlin
 Alfried-Krupp-Haus Berlin
 Binger Straße 40
 D-14197 Berlin
 Germany
 Phone: +49-30-838 58502
 Fax: +49-30-838 58540
 E-mail: sfb700@zedat.fu-berlin.de
 Web: www.sfb-governance.de

Deutsche
 Forschungsgemeinschaft

DFG

This publication can be downloaded from our website www.sfb-governance.de/en/publikationen or ordered as printed version by e-mail from sfb700@zedat.fu-berlin.de.

Executive Summary

This paper is based on a representative survey among 2034 households in North East Afghanistan, conducted in spring 2007. The main results of the survey can be summarized as follows:

Many Western observers claim that the security situation in North Afghanistan is rapidly deteriorating. We find that this sentiment is not shared by the majority of the rural population. An overwhelming majority thinks that security has very much increased over the last two years. Most Afghans credit foreign forces as well as the Afghan government with this progress.

Despite substantial progress in security one fifth of all households feel that their physical security is threatened. They feel that the main threat does not stem from Taliban or other armed forces but from organized crime. Five percent also said that they feel threatened by foreign forces.

International development agencies are widely credited by Afghans for bringing along positive and widespread changes in basic services for many communities, most notably with regard to drinking water, roads and schooling. Progress in other fields seems to be slower. Afghans tend to think that international development agencies have had little impact on progress in the agricultural sector and in improving access to electricity. Afghans also support activities of international actors that are usually associated with western values which are often seen as being at odds with Afghan values. Even in a rural context there is much support for state schooling, girls' enrollment in schools, and off-farm job opportunities for men and women.

Despite these positive assessments of foreign involvement, many Afghans remain cautious. 43% of households thought that the presence of foreign troops in general posed a threat to the local way of life and Islamic values in the community, and 21% of respondents thought that foreign developmental aid threatens the local way of life and Islamic values. Taken together, this is still a supportive environment for development cooperation, because most Afghans seem to value the concrete benefits of the foreign presence, despite widespread cultural or ideological wariness.

We find statistical evidence that development aid has a positive impact on attitudes towards the peace building mission. Communities that have broadly profited from development aid show greater support for international actors and their objectives. Development aid, however, does not lead to a lower threat perception. Levels of received aid do not influence the levels of threats that people perceive, indicating that development aid per se has little impact on objective security threats. Threat perceptions differ between districts. People in Aliabad feel more threatened, and they fear the Taliban. People in Imam Sahib feel least threatened, and here the main threat is, as in other districts, organized crime.

We also found no evidence that development aid has so far increased Afghan state capacities in the perception of respondents. The state is virtually absent as a problem solver and service provider. Most Afghans think that the state has not contributed to the provision of basic services and does not look after the needs of the rural population. This perception is hardly affected by levels of received development aid.

Assessing the Contribution of International Actors in Afghanistan.

Results from a Representative Survey¹

Jan Koehler/Christoph Zürcher

Data

The analysis presented in this paper is based on a data set which was compiled from an original mass survey. We surveyed 2034 households in 77 communities in North East Afghanistan. The communities are located in four districts: Imam Sahib, Aliabad, Warsaj and Taloqan. A map of the surveyed communities is provided in the appendix. The size of the sample varied according to the size of the community in order to ensure that the sample was representative for the community. The survey was conducted in April 2007. Response rates were above 95%. Half of the communities were selected by random sampling. The remaining communities were selected in order to make sure that the sample reflects the geographic, climatic and ethnic diversity of the four districts. The survey was designed to generate data on the perceptions of respondents on coverage and usefulness of development cooperation, everyday security, attitudes towards international actors, perception of state legitimacy, and communal organizational capacities.

Security

The provision of security is of paramount importance for the success of peace- and state building missions. A peacebuilding mission can only succeed when the overall security situation rapidly increases. Furthermore, when the population perceives peacebuilders as contributing to increased security, the legitimacy of the mission will overall increase. We therefore wanted to know how respondents perceive the trends in the security situation. Specifically, we asked whether respondents thought that security increased or decreased over the past two years in their village.

An overwhelming majority thought that security has very much increased (76%) or somewhat increased (23%). Only 0,6% thought that security levels decreased. Less than 1% had no opinion on that question.


¹ This study has been conducted in cooperation with the Evaluation Division of the Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development (BMZ). Results are published as Zürcher, Christoph/Koehler, Jan/Böhnke, Jan 2007: *Assessing the Impact of Development Cooperation in North East Afghanistan. Interim Report* (Evaluation Reports 028, Bundesministerium für wirtschaftliche Zusammenarbeit und Entwicklung), Bonn.

We gratefully acknowledge the support of many organizations and individuals. Sarah Riese, Cornelius Graubner, and Manija Gardizi provided, at various stages, research assistance. The survey has been implemented under very difficult conditions by CoAR (Coordination of Afghan Relief). We are especially grateful to Jan Böhnke for contributing to the design of the questionnaires, and for sharing his vast knowledge of statistical analysis. We thank the Volkswagen Stiftung and the Deutsche Forschungsgesellschaft for financial support.

Who contributed, according to respondents' perceptions, to this improved security situation? We assumed that four different actors could have had an impact: The Afghan government, foreign troops, local strongmen, and international organizations. We found that the positive changes are widely attributed to foreign troops: 80% of respondents thought that foreign troops contributed positively to security.


This stands in marked contrast to what respondents thought about local commanders: 78% thought that local commanders neither positively nor negatively influenced security levels, 6% saw a positive impact, and 1% thought of commanders as having a negative impact, hence actually contributing to insecurity. This is a strong indicator that the importance of the Jihadi commanders is still declining. It remains to be seen whether this trend continues.

Figure 1: Perceived contribution of governmental and non-governmental actors to improved security



We also wanted to know specifically about respondents' attitude towards the German PRT in Kunduz. Surprisingly few had actually heard about the PRT (14%); of those who had heard about the PRT, 52% rather agreed and 25% fully agreed with the statement that the PRT improved peace and security.

Next, we wanted to know about the threat perceptions of households. We asked respondents to indicate whether they felt threatened by foreign forces, Afghan security forces, Taliban, armed men from within the locality, armed men outside the locality, and criminal groups.

Figure 2: Perceived threats from different actors

20% of all households reported that they were afraid of one or many of these actors. If we only look at those households that reported threats, an interesting picture emerges: 17,3% of households were somewhat or very afraid of criminal groups, 10,6% of external armed men, 10 % of Taliban. 5% felt threatened by foreign forces and 3% of local armed men.

Development aid

The provision of security has to be the first objective of the international presence. But many observers feel that the mission is likely to fail if the peace dividend is not shared with the population in form of better provisions of basic services. Hence, development cooperation in North East Afghanistan intends also to contribute to better basic infrastructure and services.

Generally speaking, the level of development is very low even in North East Afghanistan which has to be considered as a relatively well-to-do region within the country. With regard to our sample, only 9% had their drinking water from piped water schemes, and only 25% of households had electricity. 7% of respondents reported that it was difficult to buy simple food products, and an additional 23% said that they usually could afford to buy food but that it was hard to buy new cloths and to pay for social obligations.


First, we asked respondents about the type and number of development projects of which their households or their community as a whole have been beneficiaries between 2005 and 2007. We found a surprisingly high coverage with projects being predominately in infrastructure. The question “has your community as a whole been a beneficiary of development cooperation projects during the last two years?” produced the following answers: 66% of respondents reported that their community benefited from projects related to bridges and roads; 66% of respondents thought that the community benefited from drinking water projects; 47% said the community benefited from schooling projects, 24% from irrigation projects, 16% from agricultural extension services, 14% from projects related to power supply; 6% reported of having received food aid, and 5,5% reported that their community has been a beneficiary of projects related to training

and capacity building. Only 2, 5% of respondents thought that their community had received projects that were aimed at creating new jobs. It is notable that communities that received a project in a given sector also reported that international development agencies overall contributed positively to progress in this sector. We read this as a marker for high levels of satisfaction with the project work that is being done.

We also asked respondents to report if their household had been a beneficiary of development aid. 10,8% said their household received food aid, 3,1% of households received credits, 1,7% benefited from training/advice, 2% said they profited in the form of salaries or rents and 13,3% reported to have benefited from various other services.

We then asked respondents to rate the contribution of different actors to the provision of basic services (drinking water, quality of roads, quality of schooling, agricultural production, access to electricity, more jobs) during the last two years.

Figure 3: Percentage of respondents agreeing that international development actors contributed positively to the specific sectors



About 61% of the households reported a positive impact of international development agencies on the provision of drinking water and on the on the quality of roads. 41% thought the development agencies helped to improve the quality of schooling. 16% reported a positive impact on agricultural production, 12, 2% indicated that international development agencies helped to improve access to electricity, and 2, 6% agreed that international development agencies helped to create more jobs. These findings confirm expectations. Investments in water, roads and schools were prioritized by the international community in North East Afghanistan and they produced visible and quick impacts. By contrast, capacity building, training and job-generating programs were less prominent and they take more time to generate results.

Western vs. traditional values

Acceptance of the peacebuilding mission also requires that the population perceives the policies of the peacebuilders as essentially compatible with their own value systems. Theoretically, incompatibilities can occur with regard to a wide range of issues and on different levels but it could be argued that the tensions and frictions will be felt strongest when it comes to issues of daily life. We therefore decided to focus on attitudes with regard to gender equality, schooling and presence of armed forces – issues which lie at the heart of the liberal peace building mission and that will affect local communities. We formulated six statements and asked about the respondents' attitudes towards these statements. Specifically, we asked whether respondents thought that state schooling for boys has a positive impact for the community, whether state schooling for girls had a positive impact for the community, whether state schooling was complementary to local customs and Islamic values, how respondents valued off-farm job opportunities for both men and women, and whether developmental aid and the presence of foreign troops presented a threat to local way of life and Islamic values.

We assumed that, in general, positive attitudes towards gender equality and positive attitudes towards the presence of development agencies and foreign troops signal a higher level of acceptance of the international peace building mission.

We found surprisingly high support for state schooling, girls' enrollment in schools, and off-farm job opportunities of men and women. All households agreed that education of boys has a positive impact on the community and only 39 (out of 2034) households disagreed with the statement that education for girls has a positive impact on the communities.

A large majority of households agreed that it would be good if off-farm job-opportunities were increased for both men and women; only 13,6% of the sample disagreed with this. However, when we asked in more general terms, we also found that 21% of respondents thought that foreign developmental aid threatens local way of life and Islamic values; 43 % of households even thought the presence of foreign troops posed a threat to the local way of life and Islamic values in the community. This seems to contradict respondents' surprisingly high support for girls' schooling and women off-farm labour. It seems that the high support for the specific and tangible work that international agencies do is tempered with a generally cautious attitude towards foreign presence.


How respondents see the state

Presumably, successful state-building should be reflected in a high legitimacy of the state and in the experience that the state has the capacity to solve problems and provide services. Several questions were asked to find out about how respondents see the emerging Afghan state. In general, we find that the state is credited with having contributed to the overall positive general trends. However, we also find that the state is virtually not present when we asked about specific

services. Hence, while the abstract notion of the state is met with considerable credit, the experience of beneficial state-society interactions is all but missing.

For example, 90 % of respondents thought that the government had contributed to better security during the last two years. We then also asked respondents to rate the government's contribution to progress in the provision of basic sectors and services. The results show that the respondents – quite realistically – perceive the government as having very little impact, if at all: 34 % of respondents thought the government helped to improve the quality of schooling. 5% of the households reported a positive impact of the government on the provision of drinking water. 13% reported a positive impact on the quality of roads. 6% reported a positive impact on agricultural production, 3% indicated that government helped to improve access to electricity, and only 0.3% agreed that the government helped to create more jobs. Hence the state gets much less credit for progress in these sectors than the international development agencies.

Figure 4: Percentage of respondents indicating that the actor contributed to improvement in basic services and infrastructure



Respondents also rated the conflict solving capacity of the state as being very low. When asked to which institutions they would turn if involved in a conflict about natural resources, most respondent said they would turn to the elders or to the village Shura (the village council) first. Only 2% would in the first place turn to the district administration. No respondents would turn to the provincial authorities in the first place, and only 6% would turn to provincial authorities as a second choice. When asked which institutions solved conflicts in a just way most often, respondents rated elders and local Shura as much more just as provincial and district administration. 88% thought that elders sometimes or always solved conflicts in a just way, 78% thought this was true for the local Shura, 38% for provincial authorities, and 34% for district administration. 30% also thought that the district administration never solved conflicts in a just way, whereas only 4% thought that its decisions were always just. To some extent, this question seems to be a hypothetical one anyway, reflecting rather general attitudes than real experiences. When

asked whether the state has been involved in a case of conflict regulation within the community or between communities, the overwhelming majority could not recall such an instance.

Echoing findings from previous studies in the East of Afghanistan we also find that conflict regulation is by large unprotected from corruption or violent means. 85% of respondents felt that financial bribes were always or sometimes used to influence an outcome; 67% saw kinship ties as influential, and 34% thought that force way always or sometimes applied.

Finally, we asked respondents to rate how often the district and provincial administration took care of the needs of the village population. Only 3% thought that this happened always or frequently, whereas 31% thought it happened rarely and 37% thought it never happened.

Summing up, we find that respondents are prepared to give the general notion of the state some credit for the overall positive trends; but when it comes to tangible interaction and service provision, the state is virtually absent. It is only very modestly credited for having contributed to positive changes in schooling and roads and it is virtually absent in the field of conflict regulation.

How respondents see the community

In general, the picture that emerges from the survey portrays the Afghan communities as largely self-governed, with a very respected and influential Shura (the village council) that is attributed with a great deal of conflict solving capacity. The Shura is seen as immune to manipulation by outsiders and as representing all households.

An overwhelming majority (76%) sees either the head of Shura or the elders as the most influential people in the village. Of these respondents 85% see the elders or head of shura as much more important to solve “significant problems of the community” than the district administration.

70% thought that the Shura usually takes decisions which are in the best interest of the whole community, only 2,5% thought that the Shura usually takes decisions which are in the best interest of a few households only. 25% refused to answer this question. About 25% of all interviewed households had a member regularly attending the Shura. Interestingly, those household who had a member in the Shura were a bit more skeptical with regard to the Shura’s impartiality.

Most respondents thought that the Shura acted quite independently from interference and manipulation by powerful outsiders. 69% also thought the Shura was involved in the identification of development projects, and another 69% that a specific project was chosen because a majority of households wanted it, rather than because a few powerful households or an NGO wanted it. In general, around half of the respondents saw their community itself as having contributed to improving life in the community. 52% of respondents thought that the Shura had a positive impact on the overall security situation during the last two years, whereas 30% thought the village

Shura had no impact at all. When asked whether respondents thought that their community had contributed to improvements with regard to basic services, we find a mixed picture. With regard to drinking water, agriculture and roads, around half of the respondents rather or fully agreed. However, the other half fully disagreed. We leave it for further research to explain this split perceptions. With regard to electricity and the quality of schooling, 86%, respectively 66% fully disagreed with the notion that their community indeed contributed.

Sub-regional differences

Some of the trends that we have presented so far are subject to sub-regional variations. Our sample allows for making statements about four districts: Imam Sahib, Taloqan, Aliabad and Warsaj. In the following passage we present the most notable differences between these districts.

Aliabad has the highest percentage of respondents (86%) who think that foreign forces have positively contributed to security, Warsaj the lowest (75%). But people in Aliabad also feel most threatened in general. Notably, Aliabad residents fear the Taliban more than other armed groups, whereas in Imam Sahib, Taloqan and Warsaj people are more afraid of criminal groups. This reflects geographic peculiarities: Warsaj is a remote district which is not often exposed to the presence of foreign forces and is relatively secure. Aliabad is located along the main road Kabul-Kunduz, the influence of the Taliban is said to be relatively strong and foreign forces often present.

The distribution of Western Values vs. local values also seems to follow regional patterns. We calculated a norms and value index based on six value statements that were designed to catch respondents' attitudes towards gender equality, secular schooling and presence of armed forces and development organizations (henceforth called Western Values). These issues lie at the heart of the liberal peace building mission and they affect local communities in their daily life; hence we treat higher scores as an indicator that the values and norms of respondents are compatible with what the peace builders do; lower scores indicate potential incompatibilities which may signal a lack of legitimacy of peace builders in the perception of respondents. The means of the households show variation between districts: Imam Sahib has the highest score (8,95), Aliabad the lowest (5,11). Warsaj and Taloqan are in between (6.8).

Finally, concerning the distribution of aid we find little regional differences with regard to activities in the sectors of water, roads and schooling. But food aid, electricity and jobs are unevenly distributed among districts, probably reflecting geographical idiosyncrasies. Communities in Warsaj seem to have received more food aid and electricity and less irrigation projects than communities in other districts. Again, our data here reflects geographical peculiarities. Warsaj has no need for irrigation projects, and NSP (National Solidarity Pact) has helped to build many hydro power stations.

Causal impact of development aid

Until now we have reported the results from descriptive statistics. We also investigated causal relations between development aid and a range of dependent variables, using OSL regression analysis. In the appendix we detail our methodological approach and provide the results of the regressions.

First we investigated the impact of development aid on Western Values. As reported, we defined “Western Values” based on respondents’ responses to six statements. Specifically, we asked whether respondents thought that state schooling for boys has a positive impact for the community, whether state schooling for girls had a positive impact for the community, whether state schooling was complementary to local customs and Islamic values, how respondents valued off-farm job opportunities for both men and women, and whether developmental aid and the presence of foreign troops presented a threat to the local way of life and Islamic values.

We found that development aid has a moderate but significant impact on Western Values. Our proxy indicator for development aid explains about 13% of the variance. By entering ethnicity, aid for individual households and peripheral location the models gains little in accuracy. The greatest impact has a dummy variable for the district, which explains in its own around 19% of the variance. Hence development aid has a small, positive and significant impact on attitudes toward the peacebuilding mission.

We used the same procedure for testing the impact of development aid on threat perceptions. Threat perception was proxied by an index constructed based on how much respondents said they felt threatened by different actors (Taliban, criminal groups, local and non-local armed groups, international troops). We find that the impact of the development aid is significant but very weak. The aid that communities received explains less than 1% of variance. The intuition for this result is that development aid alone does not have an impact on the actual security threats in the region; hence perceptions of security threats are not affected.

Likewise, ethnicity has significant but small impact, explaining less than 1% of variance. When looking at the ethnicities individually, we find that Tajiks feel slightly more threatened than other groups, although the effect is very weak. Again, the strongest impact is found for the district dummies: people living in Aliabad feel most threatened, those in Warsaj least.

Finally, we investigated whether development aid per se has contributed to a more positive attitude towards the Afghan government. We proxy satisfaction with the government by answers to the question “how often does the Woliswol (district government) or the provincial government take care of the needs of your village?”. We found a significant but very weak impact of aid on the level of satisfaction. Hence, the level of received aid does not lead to a more positive assessment of the Afghan government on provincial and district level.

Appendix

Measuring aid: A note on the statistical analysis

For the statistical analysis we used four different measures for aid. First, we asked respondents in what sectors their household had been a beneficiary of development aid. Second, we asked respondents to tell us in what sectors their community as whole had been a beneficiary of development projects. These measurements are respondent based and they reflect not necessarily the actual numbers of projects but rather whether respondents think that their community had profited from development cooperation in a given sector. Such a measure is by default subjective, but we think that it is justified in so far as the remembered aid actually reflects the utility of a given project to the community better than the actual amount of money spent on the project. Likewise, one could argue that the utility of a school to the community is not increased if the school was expensive to build, nor is the utility of a well reduced if the well was cheap. In other words, for our purpose it is more useful to know whether most respondents remember that a well has been built in their community than knowing that this well has cost 10.000 or 20.000 USD.

In addition, we created two expert-based measures. We asked our survey teams to establish lists of development projects that were implemented in each of the 77 communities of our sample, thereby differentiating between sectors and modality of aid projects. To a certain extent these measures are less perception driven and more objective.

Once we collected data on these four measures, we cross-checked whether they pull in the same direction. Although they show considerable variation we find that they generally tend to have the same tendencies, thereby indicating that respondent-based measures and expert-based measures actually capture the same underlying reality. A second important issue relates to our qualification of “much” and “little” aid. Our respondent based measures reflect whether respondents thought that their household or their community had profited from development activities in a given sector. Hence, we define “much aid” not as the number of projects but as the perception of whether the community has profited or not from development cooperation in a given sector.

Data exploration revealed that communities received quite different mixes of development aid.² For example, 5,9% of the communities received food aid (112 of 120 cases in Warsaj), 5,5% training/advice/capacity building (50 cases Aliabad, 2 in Imam Sahib, 28 in Taloqan, 32 in Warsaj), 46,5% of communities profited from schooling projects, 14,2% from electricity (269 of 289 cases in Warsaj), 65,9% from projects related to roads and bridges, 2,5% from projects aimed at creating jobs (13 cases in Imam Sahib, 37 in Warsaj), 16% received projects in agricultural extension services; 65,9% reported having received projects related to drinking water, and 24,1% related

² Note that we found no community that had not received some development aid during the precedent two years.

to irrigation (mostly in Imam Sahib).³ We also found clear regional patterns: food aid, electricity and jobs are predominately found in Warsaj, whereas irrigation projects are predominately found outside Warsaj. Training and advice is underrepresented in Imam Sahib. All other variables seem to be free from severe regional accumulations.

Factor and reliability analysis showed that there is not one dimension underlying these variables, hence we could not create an index. In the end, we decided to group the communities in different categories, reflecting the mix of projects they received. For this, we used Latent Class Analysis (LCA). LCA is a statistical method for finding subtypes of related cases (latent classes) from multivariate categorical data. LCA has the advantage over factor analysis/cluster analysis that no scaling properties have to be assumed. LCA estimates different classes of units of analysis that can be characterized by a common pattern of category probabilities. The easiest case is the so called “One Class Solution” that corresponds to the usual sample-mean based analytic methods. In this solution it is assumed that all units of analysis stem from the same distribution. In most cases this mean-based solution does not yield the most accurate description of the data. In LCA solutions with an ascending number of classes, class belongings are estimated and their fit to the data is evaluated via the probability that the estimated model produced the data (so-called “likelihood”). This fit is compared to the number of parameters needed to estimate this solution. The solution which indicates the best fit with the least possible parameters is the number of classes to be used to describe the data most effectively.⁴

Using LCA we were able to group the units of analysis into five classes: Communities in the first class (expected class size is 30%) are characterized by respondents’ perceptions of having profited from development projects dealing with drinking water, schooling and electricity. The number of respondents that see their communities having profited in these sectors is above the mean. With regard to roads and bridges, communities received less than the mean. Communities in this class received no projects related to irrigation and food aid at all. Finally, the number of projects related to extension services and training is close to the mean. Summing up, respondents in this class report that their communities have profited mainly from drinking water, roads and bridges, and schooling projects. We name this class *Drinking Water, Road and Bridges, and Schooling*.

The second class (expected size 24%) reaches the lowest expected score, i.e. consists of respondents reporting fewer development projects than the mean in any sector except for irrigation projects which are close to the mean. No respondent in this class reports projects related to electricity, food aid or training. We name this class *Low Coverage*.

³ Figures relating to projects of which the individual household profited are: 10,8% of all households said that they received food aid (173 cases of 219 in Warsaj); 1,7% training/advice (19 of 35 households in Aliabad); 2% salary/rent (36 of 41 cases in Warsaj; the other 5 in Aliabad); 3,1% credit (most cases in Aliabad and Warsaj); 13,3% other services.

⁴ We used the BIC to evaluate the fit of the model.

The third class (expected size 18%) consists of an above average number of respondents reporting development projects in the sectors of drinking water, roads and bridges, schooling and irrigation, as well as a slightly above average rate for extension services. They also report only very few projects related to electricity and food aid. In sum, communities in this class receive a high amount of projects. We name this class *High Coverage*.

The fourth class (expected size 17%) consists of respondents reporting that their communities profited from drinking water and (near to) average rates in roads and bridges, extension services and training. No project in the sectors schooling, irrigation, electricity and food aid was reported. We name this class *Drinking Water and Roads and Bridges*.

The fifth class (expected size 13%) consists of communities that have higher than average numbers of projects related to electricity and food aid, and also road and bridges. The number of drinking water projects is less than average and there is no irrigation project. The number of projects in schooling, extension services and training is close to the mean. We name this class *Roads and Bridges, Electricity and Food Aid*.

The distribution of these classes is contingent of the district: 91,7% of all cases belonging to class 5 are located in Warsaj, whereas most households in Imam Sahib belong to class 3.⁵

Based on results of the LCA we created a dummy variable for each class, reflecting the specific mix of development aid that a community received.

We also created a variable that reflects the number of development projects that the individual household received (Direct Aid Score). We used question 56 ("Has your household been a beneficiary of development cooperation during the last two years?"). Since households were only rarely beneficiaries of development projects, conducting a LCA on this variable yielded unsatisfactory results. Therefore the qualitative information on which sectors the projects belonged to was dropped. Instead we constructed a score, coding „0“ when no help was received by the individual household, „1“ if projects in one sector were received, „2“ if projects in two or more sectors were received.

Next we created a variable for the ethnic belonging (PASHTU, UZBEK, TAJIK, NOMAD⁶) of the respondent. Some scholars argue that attitudes toward foreign presence differ between ethnic groups and that especially among Pashtu the mistrust towards the international peacebuilders may be greater than among minority groups. Creating dummies for Pashtu, Uzbek, Tajik and Nomad allows for testing this assumption.

5 We refrain from reporting results from individual communities due to lack of space. We looked at the levels of unanimity among respondents within a given community. We qualify a community as unanimous if 90% or more of all respondents report the same number of projects. We find that overall 36% of the communities qualify as unanimous. (29% in Aliabad, 30% in Imam Sahib, 55% in Taloqan and 30% in Warsaj).

6 Strictly speaking Nomad is not an ethnic group but a socio-professional group, defined by the livelihood. Most are Pashtu.

We also created a dummy (PERIPHERY), indicating whether a community was easy accessible, or remotely located. One way of thinking about the impact of peripheral location is that the more remote a village is, the more cautious it may be toward the peace building mission. On the other hand, it could also be that remote villages are more in need of development aid, and less exposed to propaganda efforts by anti-western or anti-central government forces. Hence we wanted to empirically investigate whether peripheral location was a valid predictor.

We created a dummy for the four districts (Aliabad, Imam Sahib, Taloqan and Warsaj). There is not one specific hypothesis that we expect to test with the district dummies. Rather, we take the district dummy as a black-box for the combined effect of other, unobserved influences. If one or all district dummies are significant, as we expect it to be, we take this as a marker for an idiosyncratic combination of factors that is intrinsic to this given district and which then requires additional research. At the very least, significant district dummies signal that conditions differ across districts, hence development aid should study these differences and design policies accordingly.

A dummy variable (NSP) was created for communities in which NSP (National Solidarity Program) projects were already implemented. In Afghanistan community driven development is a major part of the international community's strategy for rebuilding the country. The so-called National Solidarity Program has focused on community participation through Community Development Councils (CDC) that have begun a wide range of projects, from irrigation and water supplies to capacity building for local governance. Creating a dummy for NSP lets us assess whether NSP communities show different characteristics.

Next, we computed two variables that capture communal ties and communal mobilizations. The Village Help Index captures the cohesiveness and mobilization capacities of a community. It is based on the perception of respondents with regard to how easy it is to get help in their village, for example for harvesting, and what one was expected to give in return. A lower score reflects that one rather has to pay for help, a higher score that one rather has to return the favor (mutual exchange).

A Village Norm Index was created, based on whether respondents thought that the community should correct families whose behavior deviate for communal norms, and whether respondents expected social sanction in case a family would not participate in hashar or similar social obligation.

Finally, we created a variable for vulnerability, indicating how much a community is threatened by natural disasters, and a variable indicating the size of the village.

We then tested the effect of our study variable (development aid) on respondents' attitudes towards the activities of the peace builders using OLS regression. All results are reported in the regression table in the appendix. They can be summarized as follows: development aid has a positive impact on attitudes towards the peace building mission. Communities that have

broadly profited from development aid show greater support for international actors and their objectives. Development aid, however, does not lead to a lower threat perception, indicating that development aid per se has little impact on objective security threats. Threat perceptions differ between districts. People in Aliabad feel more threatened, and they fear the Taliban. People in Imam Sahib feel least threatened. We found no evidence that development aid has so far increased Afghan state capacities in the perception of respondents. The state is virtually absent as a problem solver and service provider. This perception is hardly affected by levels of received development aid.

Regression Table


Table 1: Linear Regression Analyses for Western Values, Threat Perception, and Satisfaction with Provincial Government

Dependent Variable \ Independent Variables	Western Values	Threat Perception	Satisfaction with provincial government (Q54)
Q57_class2	-0.64 (0.15)***	-0.21 (0.11)	-0.30 (0.06)***
Q57_class3	0.13 (0.15)	-0.29 (0.12)*	0.20 (0.06)**
Q57_class4	-0.64 (0.13)***	-0.14 (0.10)	-0.22 (0.05)***
Q57_class5	-0.39 (0.19)*	0.18 (0.15)	0.05 (0.07)
Direct Aid	0.19 (0.11)	-0.07 (0.08)	-0.04 (0.04)
NSP	0.35 (0.18)*	0.18 (0.14)	-0.18 (0.07)*
Nomad	0.92 (0.25)***	-0.37 (0.20)	0.20 (0.10)*
Pashtu	-0.25 (0.17)	0.04 (0.13)	-0.11 (0.07)
Tajik	0.42 (0.20)*	0.44 (0.15)**	0.21 (0.08)**
Uzbek	0.28 (0.15)	0.27 (0.11)*	0.03 (0.06)
Security Change (Q10)	1.15 (0.11)***	-0.80 (0.08)***	0.11 (0.04)*
Aliabad	-0.34 (0.23)	1.57 (0.18)***	-0.05 (0.09)
Imam Sahib	2.05 (0.27)***	0.43 (0.20)*	0.36 (0.10)***
Taloqan	1.00 (0.30)**	1.35 (0.23)***	-0.12 (0.11)
PERIPHERY	0.17 (0.05)**	0.02 (0.04)	0.00 (0.02)
Resourcebase (Village)	-0.09 (0.07)	-0.12 (0.06)*	0.03 (0.03)
Vulnerability (Village)	0.47 (0.11)***	-0.26 (0.08)**	-0.05 (0.04)
Resourcebase (Household, Q9)	0.55 (0.06)***	-0.40 (0.05)***	0.13 (0.02)***
Village Norms	0.28 (0.03)***	0.01 (0.02)	0.11 (0.01)***
Village Help	-0.023 (0.02)	0.05 (0.01)***	0.00 (0.06)
Number of Projects (Village)	0.05 (0.04)	0.23 (0.03)***	-0.04 (0.02)**
Constant	-3.55	5.03	0.38
Adjusted R-squared	0.50***	0.24***	0.30***
Sample Size	1676	1862	1824

Note: The coefficients given are unstandardized coefficients. T-scores are provided in parentheses.

Map

Map 1: Surveyed Communities in Aliabad, Imam Sahib, Taloqan and Warsaj



Previously published Working Papers from the SFB-Governance Working Paper Series

Published in English and German

Risse, Thomas/Lehmkuhl, Ursula 2006: Governance in Areas of Limited Statehood: New Forms of Governance? Research Program or the Research Center (SFB) 700, SFB-Governance Working Paper Series, No. 1, Research Center (SFB) 700, Berlin, December 2006.

Draude, Anke 2007: How to Capture Non-Western Forms of Governance: In Favour of an Equivalence Functionalist Observation of Governance in Areas of Limited Statehood, SFB-Governance Working Paper Series, No. 2, Research Center (SFB) 700, Berlin, January 2007.

Published in German only

Kötter, Matthias 2007: Der Governance-Raum als Analysefaktor – am Beispiel von „Räumen begrenzter Staatlichkeit“, SFB-Governance Working Paper Series, Nr. 3, DFG Sonderforschungsbereich 700, Berlin, Januar 2007.

Ladwig, Bernd/Jugov, Tamara/Schmelzle, Cord 2007: Governance, Normativität und begrenzte Staatlichkeit, SFB-Governance Working Paper Series, Nr. 4, DFG Sonderforschungsbereich 700, Berlin, Februar 2007.

Risse, Thomas 2007: Regieren in Räumen begrenzter Staatlichkeit. Zur „Reisefähigkeit“ des Governance-Konzeptes, SFB-Governance Working Paper Series, Nr. 5, DFG Sonderforschungsbereich 700, Berlin, April 2007.

Published in English only

Schäferhoff, Marco/Campe, Sabine/Kaan, Christopher 2007: Transnational Public-Private Partnerships in International Relations. Making Sense of Concepts, Research Frameworks and Results, SFB-Governance Working Paper Series, No. 6, DFG Research Center (SFB) 700, Berlin, August 2007.

These publications can be downloaded from www.sfb-governance.de/publikationen or ordered as printed versions via e-mail to sfb700@zedat.fu-berlin.de.

The Authors

Jan Koehler is a member of the research project C1 'Transnational Cooperation and the Provision of Security in the Context of Limited Statehood'. He holds a Master's Degree in Social Anthropology from Freie Universität Berlin and has accomplished extensive fieldwork in the former Soviet Union over the past ten years focussing on informal organisation of violence and justice in the South Caucasus. Contact: jkoehler@zedat.fu-berlin.de



Christoph Zürcher is one of the coordinators of the research project C1 'Transnational Cooperation and the Provision of Security in the Context of Limited Statehood'. He is a professor of International Relations at Freie Universität Berlin. His research focusses on Theories of International Relations, conflicts, interventions, and state-building with a special interest in the region of the former Soviet Union and Afghanistan. Contact: zuercher@zedat.fu-berlin.de



Research Project C1

The project analyses transnational co-operations between state and non-state actors in the context of limited statehood. In eight ethnographic, micro political case studies of local conflict arenas in Tajikistan, Afghanistan and Pakistan, we investigate if and how such external stabilisation strategies can work as „functionl equivalents to statehood“ that transform violent conflicts, provide security and promote local conflict managing.

Research Framework of the Research Center (SFB) 700

Governance has become a central theme in social science research. The Research Center (SFB) 700 *Governance in Areas of Limited Statehood* investigates governance in areas of limited statehood, i.e. developing countries, failing and failed states, as well as, in historical perspective, different types of colonies. How and under what conditions can governance deliver legitimate authority, security, and welfare, and what problems are likely to emerge? Operating since 2006 and financed by the German Research Foundation (DFG), the Research Center involves the Freie Universität Berlin, the University of Potsdam, the European University Institute, the Hertie School of Governance, the German Institute for International and Security Affairs (SWP), and the Social Science Research Center Berlin (WZB).

Partner Organisations of the Research Center (SFB) 700

Host University
Freie Universität Berlin



University of Potsdam



Social Science Research Center Berlin (WZB)



German Institute for International and Security Affairs (SWP)



Hertie School of Governance



European University Institute
Florence (EUI)

