ECPR 2009 section chaired by SFB 700

Generally, the assessment of the effectiveness of private governance arrangements focuses on the impact of the initiative in terms of whether or not the conditions in the area of the initiative are addressed and improved. However, neither the impact of interaction on participating actors nor the further institutional development of the initiative itself are taken into account. Therefore, in addition to the important dimension of impact effectiveness expressed in improving social conditions, the paper argues that initiatives can also be effective by developing a robust decision-making structure which was not intended in the beginning as well as influencing participating companies with regard to social and environmental issues in general terms. By agreeing on specific norms, initiatives potentially create a mandatory dynamism which influences both their further institutional development and the participating companies. From this wider perspective on effectiveness, the distinction between voluntary and binding governance arrangements becomes less important. The theoretical argument is empirically illustrated by the analysis of the emergence and the development of the Voluntary Principles on Security and Human Rights (VPs). Starting out as a voluntary initiative, the VPs have by now become a comprehensive and concrete standard although this was not intended in the beginning. Participating companies, NGOs, and states together have developed participation criteria, created a plenary session and a secretariat while at the same time integrated new countries and companies to the process. In terms of effective governance, the paper argues that this development was only possible because of the voluntary nature of the initiative. Effectiveness should thus not be reduced only to binding rules and concrete standards but also include a wider perspective on how governance arrangements develop over time and how they influence participating companies in general terms.

In Morocco the involvement of non-state actors - such as grassroots associations, NGOs, cooperatives and consultancy firms - in the management of development and social policies is increasingly important. Moreover, it is a peculiar pattern for defining the Moroccan regime since the launch of the National Initiative for Human Development, started up directly by the king in 2005: the involvement of non-state actors at all levels of the policy cycle is presented as a matter of efficiency in improving life conditions. The involvement of non-state actors in providing collective goods is generally considered as a remedy for a condition of limited statehood, depending on the weakness of the State, on its crisis or on its failure in exerting governmental functions. Political sociology, however, might help to show that their involvement may configure an indirect strategy of government, which is neither typical of weak States nor necessarily implies the loss of control by the State. By considering the State as a conceptual variable this paper proposes to rethink the link between the formation of the State and the involvement of non-state actors in absolving governmental functions. The concept of stateness will be preferred to the one of statehood in arguing that the involvement of non-state actors can be deliberately chosen as a style of government, suitable to preserve legitimation and effectiveness in exerting governmental functions. Based on empirical results of field research, this paper adopts participation of non-state actors as an independent variable in order to explore possible reconfiguration of stateness in Morocco. Invoked effectiveness and legitimation in providing collective goods through non state-actors will be firstly examined at the level of political discourses. Hence, they will be adopted as starting point in order to explore how, in the practices, governance arrangements evolve when non-state actors are involved.

The paper examines the influence of institutional design of private regulation initiatives (PRIs) on the compliance with and implementation of transnational social and labor codes of conduct. The implementation of ILO and other labor standards in transnational value chains is clearly one goal of the International Community. Since international efforts have not been significantly successful, many hopes are directed towards PRIs such as Social Accountability International or the Fair Labor Association. These PRIs try to enhance compliance of transnational companies (TNCs) with social and labor rights within their globalized supply chains. Due to the lack of state capacity to enforce hard law especially in weak states where production facilities of TNCs are located, these PRIs can function as a complement. The output and impact of such initiatives are rather mixed. Whereas compliance with the prohibition of child labor seems to have improved over time, freedom of association and minimum wages are mostly not complied with by suppliers of TNCs. Rationalist and constructivist authors identified institutional design, reputation and costs of compliance as important factors to enhance norm compliance for states. Regarding the governance of PRIs the focus of the literature has been on their emergence and legitimacy. By now, no research has tackled the question of how the institutional design of a PRI influences TNC compliance with and the implementation of codes of conduct. This paper tries to answer the question of how institutional design can enhance the code compliance of the rule addressees.

South Africa is a water scarce country; at the same time, its emerging economy is to a great extent dependent on ‘water as an input variable’, e.g. in agriculture, mining. Especially the mining industry has always exerted a considerable influence on water resources management, with water being a key production factor and a receiving medium for this industry. In the past the lack of integration of industrial water needs and water requirements for societal use has been widely criticized. The constitutionally granted right of access to water and other legislation is designed to promote the emergence of more integrative approaches to water resources management. Against this background, the paper presents case studies in two South African regions illustrating the role of private actors from the mining industry, in addressing persisting and increasing water challenges. Both regions, the North West and the Limpopo provinces, are dominated by the water-intensive platinum industry. They are also stricken by water scarcity and backlog in terms of connectivity to water infrastructure. In the North West province, the mining industry has created a common platform, bringing on board local municipalities, to address pressing water management problems. The solution comprises the construction of pipelines to provide industry grade water to the mines to free-up potable water for communities. Only by making this water available, urban development in this region will be sustainable. In the Limpopo province platinum mining is still at a developing stage and the need for improving industrial and municipal water infrastructure is higher than in the North West. With local government being considerably weaker in this region, industry is a key driver in setting-up future water infrastructure. In both regions, industrial water development thus significantly influences the shaping of water policy and determines future growth and development strategies. National government has established guidelines in order to provide for integrated water resources development along a sustainable trajectory; still the outcomes in terms of the right to water remain unclear. The paper examines the key driving forces and actors in these processes and analyses the implications for overall sustainable development in these two regions.

Rather than an ontologically construed condition of existence, the paper regards security as, first and foremost, a social practice, discernible in many different contexts and on various levels of collective organization. Most generally, it can be described in terms of three analytically distinct qualities, the first two of which may be referred to as the discourse of security. This consists, on the one hand, of a particular security concept, which determines who ought to be secured against which kind of threats. On the other hand, any such concept may be embedded within a number of world-views or mentalities, in turn proposing different strategies or ways of dealing with the threats in question. Finally, any combination of concepts and strategies gains visible and concrete manifestation through certain institutions, which may best be understood as networks. This latter quality is particularly apparent in the diversification of types of actors, which have become involved in both the authorization and provision of various security-related services, thereby aligning with each other in complex and innovative ways – most notably (but by no means exclusively) in spaces of limited state capacity. Proceeding from a critical review of recent understandings of “security governance” in political science, and drawing upon examples from Sub-Saharan Africa, the paper mobilizes and partially expands upon inter-disciplinary insights from the field of network analysis as well as “nodal governance” in order to ask how security practices – of whatever type – ought to be (empirically) represented and (normatively) assessed. In doing so, the implicit or explicit state-centrism of alternative models is challenged on two accounts: first, by introducing a heuristic tool (“security network analysis”), which – at least in theory – allows for any kind of functional relation between any type of actor, state or non-state, hence avoiding, as far as possible, any ‘blind spots’ in the mapping of security networks. Second, it proposes a set of normative criteria, which do not require reference to an imagined ideal of a state-owned monopoly. All in all, by lifting the analytical scope beyond the simplistic Hobbesian dichotomy of Leviathan or anarchy, appreciation of security provision in fragile states is thus considerably expanded.

In our paper we develop a framework for the analysis of transnational PPP’s effectiveness. We operationalize effectiveness using indicators for PPP’s output, outcome, and impact. Drawing on case studies of 16 PPP in the area of transnational health, social and environmental governance, we explain under which conditions PPP successfully provide public goods in developing countries. As to explanatory factors, we focus on the degree of a PPP’s institutionalization, the quality of its process management, its capacity development measures, given opportunities for organizational learning and the extent of the inclusion of its stakeholders. We find strong empirical support for the relevance of the legalization approach for the study of public-private partnerships. Our comparison reveals that the degree of institutionalization significantly affects the effectiveness of partnerships. However, while the degree of institutionalization is very relevant for PPP in service provision and standard setting, it is less important for those partnerships engaging in knowledge exchange. Moreover, we observe many institutional changes during the first years of PPP’s existence. In that context, we find process management to significantly influence the effectiveness of service and standard setting partnerships. Surprisingly, there is hardly any empirical evidence for a positive correlation between inclusion and effectiveness. Nevertheless, most PPP strive to establish a governance structure that attempts to meet the requirements of input-legitimacy or that combines them with considerations for effectiveness. In sum, we found substantial support for the assumption that the institutional design of PPP matters.

Since Stenning’s and Shearing’s landmark work on private security, plenty of studies on the subject have been realized and 20 years later, we know a lot about how private policing is regulated and working in European and especially Anglo-Saxon societies. But with few exceptions, our knowledge on private security arrangements in other parts of the world is still limited. In particular Latin America has proven to be a blind spot in this regard although its societies have become to rely heavily on private security mechanisms given their states’ disability and/or unwillingness to provide security as a public good. In the cities of Mexico City and Buenos Aires for example, guards and vehicles of private security companies are today familiar aspects of the urban landscape. In our presentation, we address the development of private security in both cities and demonstrate that despite substantial legal regulation efforts, the reality of the local private security markets frequently stands in striking contrast to the impressive legal obligations, whose strict enforcement seems to be the exception rather than the rule.. This finding hints to the necessity to look for other factors that may explain the existing gap between legal prerequisites and everyday reality. Based on our empirical research we identify the following three aspects: the control capacity of governance institutions, the political and economic interests of governance actors and the specific characteristics of the governance object, in this case, security. In the final section of our paper, we relate our findings to the question of governance failure.

In the development of nodal governance theory, scholars (especially Benoît Dupont) have been developing mapping tools and using these to develop a clearer understanding of how governing entities (nodes) are distributed and related. This paper uses current research on the governance of gangs in a deprived urban American city to further develop this body of work. The focus of this research is on building (primarily) qualitative tools that can be deployed by scholars and practitioners as a means of shedding light on both the characteristics of nodes as well as the ways in which nodal capacities are, or could be related to one another in furtherance of good governance.

Current debates on new modes of governance lack a fundamental understanding of power. As long as the results of modern theories of power are not included, the search for appropriate measures and instruments of governing will remain fragmentary. Moreover, governing in areas of limited statehood demands a modified approach since most theories of governance implicitly presuppose at least minimally functioning institutions. The concept of ‘soft governing’ (Göhler 2004, 2007, Göhler/Höppner/De la Rosa 2009) can enhance our understanding of alternative mechanisms and instruments. The theoretical approach behind ‘soft governing’ focuses on results building on the theories of Foucault (discursive power), Habermas (communicative power) and Bourdieu (symbolic power), in order to conceptualise alternative mechanisms of governance. We overcome constraints of current governance debates by concentrating on forms of action that include the intentional use of discursive and communicative practices as well as symbolic forms. These modes of governing rely on horizontal rather than vertical relations between governing and governed and therefore do not necessarily depend on the presence of functioning hierarchical institutions of governance. The proposed paper will focus on the use of discursive practices and symbolic forms in mechanisms of governance and on their interaction. We lay out some of the ways in which both are used to govern and than go on to show how they depend on each other. We argue further that the recognition of discursive practices depends on their symbolic representation toward the addresses. Inversely, the recognition of symbols as valid representations of power remains fragile without the daily enforcement through discursive practices. While mutual relations between symbolic forms and discursive practices are implied in most important theories, looking at their interaction in mechanisms of governance enables a better understanding of non-hierarchical forms of governance and their role in hybrid political orders.

This paper presents a theoretical framework that builds upon three interlinked questions: How do security governance structures evolve in the context of state failure and/or collapse? What modes and qualities of security can emerge under such conditions and how durable are such structures? And finally, in which way do continuous violent conflicts lead to the formation of security markets and which market logic does the trade in protection commodities follow? To approach answers to these questions, we first develop ideas on the logic of security markets in areas of limited statehood which are based on economic approaches and peace and conflict theory. Secondly, we make us of the concept of opportunity structures to encompass the changing material, geographical and conflict related conditions of control over the use of force. By referring to and extending arguments made by Charles Tilly (1985, 1990) and Mancur Olsen (1993) we assume that the evolution of political order is a function of resource availability and extraction by armed groups and the organizational structure of such a process. Theoretically, we connect the formation and the paths of security governance to the logics of security markets which emerge from a lack of monopolization of the legitimate use of force by states. Such rather uncontrolled and -regulated security markets entail specific opportunities which change over time and frame the formulation of preference and behavior of armed groups. The main argument is thus, that specific economic, geographic or conflict-dynamic opportunity structures do not constitute simply an explanatory factor for the outbreak or the dynamics of violent conflicts. They also provide information about the conditions under which providers of security determine the utility functions of the use of force. Depending on the characteristics of such opportunities one outcome of this calculus might be that even under the conditions of violent conflict there are times and spaces in which non-state armed actors arrive at collectively binding decisions and are interested in a minimum of security.

Can transnational public-private partnerships (PPPs) provide collective goods in countries that are characterized by capacity weaknesses, mismanagement, and armed conflict? And if so, how can PPPs work constructively with governments that exercise limited sovereignty, are severely incapacitated, and have little legitimacy? In this paper, I concentrate on global health partnerships and investigate the country programs of the Global Fund To Fight AIDS, Tuber-culosis and Malaria in Kenya and Southern Sudan. Both case studies demonstrate that weak country health systems are a serious barrier for the effectiveness of global health partnerships. While the coordination of the implementing partners is crucial, the scarce management capac-ity at the ministerial level can seriously hinder a successful program implementation. Health systems in developing countries are furthermore characterized by a shortage of trained health workers and bottlenecks in the health workforce also negatively effect the implementation of programs. Health partnerships are therefore admonished to build up the health system capaci-ties of countries, harmonize their procedures with other donors, and align their projects with country sys¬tems. I demonstrate whether and to what extent the Global Fund has successfully done so in Kenya and South Sudan. On the other hand, I point to the unintended side-effects of the recent proliferation of global health initiatives, and argue that poor coordination among health initiatives can be a severe problem. As global initiatives often require the establishment of new structures and procedures, there is the risk that the growing number of health initia-tives overextends the institutional capabilities of government agencies. Another negative side-effect of health partnerships is that national health workers are recruited by global health ini-tiatives, which can further aggravate the bottlenecks of the public health system.

The concept of global governance embraces both a multiplication and a fragmentation of institutional frameworks, decision-making forums and policy-making bodies. This development has been, by many, welcomed as a sign of enhanced flexibility, greater funding flows and reduced stalemate compared to traditional intergovernmental cooperative structures. However, observing the outcomes and long-term impact of old and new actors and strategies in foreign aid, it has become increasingly clear that the proliferation of sources and channels of aid (in health as elsewhere) has not yielded solely beneficial effects on recipient and donor countries alike. This has particularly been the case in health politics, in which a number of policy areas such as, most notably, HIV and AIDS, are characterised by institutional overload at the global level. The challenges associated with this institutional overload have, in recent years, become apparent, before all, in the field, i.e. in the places where multilateral institutions, bilateral foreign policy and development agencies, public-private initiatives and international civil society organisations strive to contribute to prosperity, development and behavioural change among political stakeholders, private actors and society at large. This panel envisages to assess the contribution of global health actors to local health policy-making in low- and middle-income countries, asking about their (positive or negative) impact on local governance capacities. On the one hand, it looks at the governance functions that global health actors fulfil in countries with limited governance capacities. On the other hand, the panel addresses ongoing processes of conflict and competition among external actors as well as their potential negative externalities on local health governance, and it will discuss how weak coordination between external actors affects health policy-making and –implementation in frail national health systems.