

DRAFT: Comments Most Welcome!

Governance Configurations in Areas of Limited Statehood: Actors, Modes, Institutions, and Resources

by
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One of the major insights and findings of our Collaborative Research Center pertains to the fact that the absence of state authorities in areas of limited statehood does not equal anarchy, disorder, and chaos as the literature on failing and failed states often implies (Rotberg 2003, 2004; Schneckener 2004; Mata and Ziaja 2009).¹ Rather, we do find governance – both rule-making and the provision of collective goods – in areas of limited statehood which is both legitimate and effective under certain conditions. While central state authorities are either absent or too weak to exercise authority, a variety of actors – international, national, local as well as state and non-state – govern in areas of limited statehood (see also paper by Sven Chojnacki for this conference).

This paper presents a typology of governance configurations found empirically in our various research projects. The typology does not represent the universe of possible configurations. Rather, I concentrate on governance configurations which the various research projects of our Center have reported in various publications. Thus, this paper represents a first effort at systematizing what we see empirically. This does not mean that the typology is purely descriptive. Rather, it is informed by various analytical distinctions and dimensions, such as

- Type of actors involved in governance, particularly state and non-state;
- Modes of governance, particularly hierarchical vs. the various non-hierarchical modes of social interaction (with a particular focus on bargaining and arguing/deliberation);
- Institutional embeddedness, whether formal or informal;
- Material and ideational resources of actors and the consequences for power (a)symmetries.

This paper starts (and repeats) some conceptual clarifications of our Research Center. The main part of the paper introduces the various governance configurations. The paper concludes by looking at various ways in which these configurations relate to each other leading to interlocking configurations.

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1. Conceptual Clarifications²

(If you are familiar with the SFB's conceptual framework, you may skip this part, particularly the definitions of "limited statehood," "governance", and "modes of governance")

Limited Statehood

The SFB 700 investigates under which conditions effective and legitimate governance is possible in areas of limited statehood. Limited statehood, however, implies a conceptualization of statehood which, of course, has filled libraries. One problem for us has been from the beginning how to distinguish statehood from the functions, services, and tasks a state is supposed to provide (see also Tanja Börzel's paper for this conference). For example, if we define a state as an entity that provides security for its citizens, we can no longer distinguish between statehood and security governance in a meaningful way. Overcoming the state-centric view of governance, however, has been one of the central theoretical goals of our research center.

In our understanding, a state is a hierarchical structure of authority. In addition, modern states have fixed territorial border and usually enjoy international recognition as sovereign entity (with some exceptions). As Tanja Börzel explains in her paper, *statehood* is a property, normally of the state. In this context, we have deliberately opted for a rather narrow concept of statehood. We follow rather closely Max Weber's conceptualization of statehood as an institutionalized rule structure with the ability to rule authoritatively (*Herrschaftsverband*) and to legitimately control the means of violence (*Gewaltmonopol*, cf. Weber 1921/1980; on statehood in general see Benz 2001; Schuppert 2009).³ While no state governs hierarchically all the time, states at least possess the ability to authoritatively make, implement, and enforce central decisions for a collectivity. In other words, states command what Stephen Krasner calls "domestic sovereignty," i.e., "the formal organization of political authority within the state and the ability of public authorities to exercise effective control within the borders of their own polity" (Krasner 1999, 4). This understanding allows us to strictly distinguish between statehood as an institutional structure of authority, on the one hand, and the kind of governance a state provides. The latter is an empirical not a definitional question. E.g., control over the means of violence is a constitutive feature of statehood. Whether this monopoly over the use of force actually provides security for the citizens as a public good and irrespective of one's race, gender, or kinship, becomes an empirical question. Whether or not a state's polity is democratic and bound by human rights also concerns empirical issues which should not be confused with definitional ones.

If statehood is defined by the monopoly over the means of violence and/or the ability to make and enforce central political decisions, we can now define more precisely what "limited statehood" means. In short, while areas of limited statehood still belong to internationally recognized states (even the failed states Somalia still commands international sovereignty), it is their domestic sovereignty which is severely circumscribed. Areas of limited statehood then concern those parts of a country in which central authorities (governments) lack the ability to implement and enforce rules and decisions and/or in which the legitimate monopoly over the means of violence is lacking, at least temporarily. The ability to enforce rules or to control the means of violence can be restricted along various dimensions: 1) territorial, i.e., parts of a country's territorial spaces; 2) sectoral, that is, with regard to specific policy areas; 3) social, i.e., with regard to specific parts of the population; and 4) temporal. It follows that the opposite of "limited statehood" is not "unlimited" but "consolidated" statehood, i.e. those areas of a country in which the state enjoys the monopoly over the means of violence and/or the ability

² For the following see Risse 2011.

³ Weber's notion of legitimacy with regard to the control over the means of violence should not be confused with an empirically derived notion of a legitimate order which is considered just and fair. Rather, "legitimate monopoly over the means of violence" concerns the claim that the order is legitimate.

to make and enforce central decisions. Thinking in terms of configurations of limited statehood also implies thinking in degrees of limited statehood rather than using the term in a dichotomous sense.

Governance

In its most general version, governance refers to all modes of co-ordinating social action in human society. Williamson, for example, distinguished between governance by markets and governance by hierarchy (i.e., the state), later scholars added governance by networks to this list (see Williamson 1975; Rhodes 1997; Kooiman 1993). However, this understanding that identifies governance with any kind of social ordering appears to be too broad.

As a result, we use a somewhat narrower concept that is linked to politics. By *governance*, we mean the various *institutionalized modes of social coordination to produce and implement collectively binding rules, or to provide collective goods*. This conceptualization follows closely the understanding of governance that is widespread within the social sciences (see e.g. Mayntz 2004, 2008; Kohler-Koch 1998; Benz 2004; Schuppert 2005; Schuppert and Zürn 2008). Governance consists of both structural (“institutionalized”) and process dimensions (“modes of social coordination”). Accordingly, governance covers steering by the state (“governance by government”), governance via cooperative networks of public and private actors (“governance with government”), as well as rule-making by non-state actors or self-regulation by civil society (“governance without government;” Benz 2004; Czempiel and Rosenau 1992; Grande and Pauly 2005; Zürn 1998). Governance is supposed to provide collectively binding rules as well as collective goods.⁴

The modern Western nation-state, thus, constitutes a governance configuration. First, it provides a structure of rule and authority over a specific population in a specific territory, a system of political and social institutions to generate and to implement authoritative political decisions. Today, democracy and the rule of law belong to the generally accepted norms of these institutions for authoritative rule-making. Second, the Western nation-state has the task to protect the internal and external security of its citizens. The monopoly over the means of violence is supposed to do just that. Finally, the rendering of public services is part of the classical responsibilities of the state, from the creation of economic stability, the guarantee of minimal social security to public health, education and, today, the maintenance and the creation of a clean environment. In short, the modern Western nation-state provides governance in the areas of rule-making and enforcement, on the one hand, and with regard to collective goods such as security, welfare, and a clean environment, on the other. While this nation-state is undergoing a profound transformation (Leibfried and Zürn 2005; Hurrelmann et al. 2007), its ability to ultimately make, implement, and enforce decisions is beyond doubt, even if the modern state privatizes or de-regulates previously public services. In other words, the modern state’s “shadow of hierarchy” is never in doubt, even in the age of profound (neoliberal) privatization and de-regulation (Börzel 2008).

This changes under conditions of limited statehood. Governance in areas of limited statehood requires providing these very governance services in the absence of a fully functioning state exerting at least a “shadow of hierarchy” with the ability to enforce and implement decisions. Yet, governance does happen even under conditions of limited statehood. The examples of Somaliland and other fragile or failed states demonstrate that governance and collective goods are often provided under rather adverse conditions. This paper explores the governance configurations which we find in areas of limited statehood. Governance configurations consist of an actor dimension and a process dimension. We call the latter “modes of governance.”

⁴ Here, we follow the usual definition of collective goods as characterized by non-exclusive access and/or non-rivalry in consumption. At least one of these conditions has to be present for a good to qualify as collective or common (see Héritier 2002).

Governance Actors

Governance is by definition a public affair, but any actor can become a governance actor, blurring the notions of the public or private character of actors. Therefore, we distinguish between state and various types of non-state actors at different levels. State actors can comprise members of the executive, legislature, and judiciary at national or subnational levels, but also international intergovernmental (or supranational) organizations 'beyond the nation-state'. Non-state actors are first of all for profit and not for profit organizations, again at the national or international level. However, apart from this triad of state, market, and society, a third type of non-state actors possesses charismatic or traditional authority, granting it a role in political leadership outside of formal state institutions.

Governance Actors		<i>local/domestic</i>	<i>Trans- and inter-national/external</i>
<i>state</i>		government/executive parliament/legislature judiciary	international (inter-state) organizations (IO); other states and their agencies (e.g. donor agencies)
<i>non-state</i>	civil society (not for profit)	associations, non-governmental organizations (NGOs), etc.	International Non-Governmental Organizations (INGOs); Transnational Social Movements, etc.
	private sector (for profit)	companies	multinational companies
	"traditional"	clan chief, village elder	transnational religious organizations (e.g. catholic church); transnational associations of indigenous peoples etc.

Modes of Governance

The process dimension of governance concerns modes of steering. The modern Western nation-state has the ability of hierarchical steering, that is, to authoritatively enforce the law, ultimately through policing and "top down" command and control. It is precisely this ability to enforce decisions which is lacking in areas of limited statehood. To the extent that hierarchical steering and authoritative rule do take place in areas of limited statehood, we have to look for actors other than the respective national governments. In the following, we basically distinguish between hierarchical and non-hierarchical modes of coordination. Hierarchical coordination implies a relationship of superiority and subordination that allows the unilateral setting and enforcement of rules (order and obedience, command and control). If this relationship is institutionalized and vested with a claim to legitimacy, we speak of authority to rule (*Herrschaft*) as a hierarchical mode of governance.

Non-hierarchical steering involves creating and manipulating incentives and "benchmarking," as well as initiating communicative learning processes (Börzel and Risse 2005; Göhler, Höppner, and De La Rosa 2009). Positive incentives, but also sanctions are meant to affect the cost-benefit calculations of the relevant parties and to induce the desired behaviour. These modes of governance as well as bargaining processes are based on a rational choice logic of consequentialism. But governance also includes non-manipulative communication such as arguing, persuasion and learning. The latter modes of governance aim at challenging fixed interest and preferences so that actors are induced in a socialization process to

internalize new rules and norms. These modes of governance follow a logic of appropriateness (March and Olsen 1998) or of communicative rationality (Habermas 1992; Risse 2000).

Institutions

Governance consists of *institutionalized* modes of social coordination. Institutions are norms, rules, and procedures – both formal and informal – shaping the relations between the different actors in a governance configuration (March and Olsen 1989; Göhler 2004; Keohane 1989; Scharpf 1997). In this sense, governance configurations *are* institutions insofar as they consist of norms and rules (e.g. hierarchical relations between actors vs. formal equality of actors involved despite asymmetrical distribution of resources, and so forth) as well as decision-making procedures (e.g. consensus vs. majority rule). In many cases, these norms and rules are enshrined in formal constitutional documents and legal texts; in other cases, the institutional setting is completely informal, but nevertheless has a very strong logic of appropriateness to it (various forms of so-called “traditional authority” in indigenous communities). Thus, institutional rules specify the role of governance actors in exercising functions of decision-making and implementation and they constitute their (formal) equality or inequality. Furthermore, institutions can affect the use of specific modes of governance, e.g. the choice of arguing over bargaining, by creating a setting more favourable to one than to another.

Moreover, governance configurations are usually embedded in larger institutional settings. International law, for example, provides a rule structure governing interactions between various state actors, both external and internal. Multinational corporations are subject to home country laws and regulations that partially even extend to their investments in areas of limited statehood. The same holds true for NGOs. To what extent international law also provides binding rules for non-state actors and whether or not there is something like “non-state law” is subject to some debate (Rudolf 2007; Schuppert and Kötter 2007; Schuppert 2011).

Resources and Power

One of the central criticisms against the governance discourse in the social sciences has been that it has a problem-solving bias which ignores relationships of power and of inequality (see e.g. Mayntz 2008, 2009 on this point). Yet, the governance configurations which we try to describe in this paper do not come free of power (see Göhler 2007). This is fairly obvious with regard to hierarchical coordination or authoritative rule (*Herrschaft*) which constitutes an institutionalized power structure of order and obedience. But even the non-hierarchical modes of governance which we observe empirically in areas of limited statehood, are not powerless. The use of positive incentives or negative sanctions only works if somebody has the resources and, thus, the power to influence the cost-benefit calculations of others. The ability to frame an argument involves discursive power, as Michel Foucault reminds us (Foucault 1991). Even a Habermasian “ideal speech situation” constitutes a counterfactual presupposition against which real discourses in the real world have to be measured.

Asymmetries between governance actors, created by institutional provisions and/or by an unequal distribution of their material and immaterial resources, are part and parcel of a specific governance configuration and thus provide a window of opportunity for the use of different modes of governance and potentially shape the substantive outcome of governance. Governance actors bring resources to the governance configuration that might not directly affect their formal status but definitely shape their interaction. Material and immaterial resources provide actors with the capacities to fulfil certain governance functions, to exercise influence via modes of governance, and to shape substantive outcome of non-hierarchical coordination. The distribution of resources among governance actors can create a situation of (asymmetric) interdependence in order to govern effectively, as governance actors need a number of different resources, e.g. knowledge and expertise for informed decision-making, organizational capacities for implementation, and legitimacy.

Resources	
<i>Material</i>	funds
	staff
	organizational capacity
	...
<i>Immaterial, Ideational</i>	knowledge and information
	moral/charismatic authority
	...

Resource asymmetries constitute power relationships that are crucial for the analysis of different governance configurations. But power is as elusive a concept as statehood or governance (see e.g. Baldwin 2002; Barnett and Duvall 2005; Lukes 1974). It can refer to a relationship between actors, but it can also refer to a structure governing this relationship. *Relational power* refers to the direct exercise of power in a specific interaction. Robert Dahl's definition of power as the ability of A to get B to do something what he/she would not have done otherwise (Dahl 1961; see Baldwin 2002) fits this category. This is the "power as (direct) influence" concept which is familiar to most of us and is based on the asymmetrical distribution of resources and capabilities (whether material or ideational; see above). This understanding includes the "power of the better argument" or the "power in discourse" (Holzscheiter 2010) whereby actors give reasons and justifications to persuade others of the normative or factual validity of their points (following a Habermasian understanding of discourse, cf. Habermas 1981, 2007).

In contrast, *structural power* refers to constitutive relationships which define the properties and identities of actors. Capital-labour or master-slave relationships embody structural power. So does the power of the global North over the global South in the global economy. The hierarchical modes of coordination mentioned above also involve structural power insofar as legitimate and authoritative rule (*Herrschaft*) constitutes the actors involved as rulers and ruled. But structural power can also refer to the "power of discourse" in a Foucaultian sense (Foucault 1991; see Holzscheiter 2010). The more meanings are fixed, knowledge becomes consensual, and norms are taken for granted, the more these ideational constructs exert structural power.

In any governance configuration, several dimensions of power can be present, empowering different governance actors to shape the process of governance according to their preferences. While a hierarchical governance configuration is defined by the structural power of authority, the distribution of resources might partly compensate for this asymmetry, giving the ruled a greater say in decision-making and implementation. Especially in areas of limited statehood, the state might lack material resources for the effective implementation or enforcement of rules and its ability to rule authoritatively might solely hinge on its legitimacy. While the various power dimensions might be mutually reinforcing in strengthening one actor that unites both relational and structural power, they could also mitigate each other's effect, e.g. if governance institutions curtail the power derived from monetary and organizational resources, privileging expertise and reputation in a context of communicative action and arguing.

2. Governance Configurations: A Typology

A typology of governance configurations with all possible combinations of governance actors and modes of governance is not feasible. The following typology uses modes of governance as well as type of actors as its main dimensions. As the nation-state is still a point of reference for analyzing governance, I start from the distinction of governance with and without the

state in hierarchical and non-hierarchical settings (see also Beisheim et al. 2011). For each of the configurations, I discuss the modes of social coordination as well as the distribution of power and resources in detail. Throughout the paper, I use empirical examples from the SFB 700's individual research projects.

Governance in areas of limited statehood does not mean the absence of hierarchical modes of governance. It only means that central state authorities are too weak to exercise domestic sovereignty. We actually find several configurations involving hierarchical modes of steering in areas of limited statehood. By definition, hierarchical governance through the exercise of rule and authority (*Herrschaft*) involves structural power. Moreover, it usually involves asymmetrical distribution of resources, whether material or ideational. Hierarchical steering which is not backed up by resources is usually not very effective, as the West is learning the hard way in Afghanistan (→ C9 Daxner) or the Pope had to realize in Medieval Europe (→ B10 Esders).

1. Exporting Statehood: Colonial Rule and Modern Trusteeships

In this case, international (intergovernmental) organizations or foreign states and their agencies (such as Western powers) provide the rules and regulations for governance in areas of limited statehood. In other words, rule-making takes place outside the state, while international, national and/or local actors – both state and non-state - implement the rules or provide the respective services. But the primary rule-setting “governors” – to use a term introduced by Avant et al. (Avant, Finnemore, and Sell 2010) are external state actors as well as international organizations (IOs; *actor* dimension). In this case, statehood resides with the external actors who enjoy the monopoly over the means of violence and/or the ability to make and implement decisions authoritatively. In other words, while the governed territory remains an area of limited statehood, the ability to steer hierarchically and to cast a “shadow of hierarchy” resides with the external state actors (*modes* of governance). A historical example for this “shadow of hierarchy” constitutes British “indirect rule” of its colonies (see also the Roman empire's rule over its provinces) which left local authorities quite some leeway for self-governance as long as the colonial authorities were not challenged (Lehmkuhl 2007). Similar “shadows of hierarchy” are cast in today's semi-sovereign trusteeships such as Kosovo or Afghanistan.

This is not to say that foreign powers and IOs always rule authoritatively and that non-hierarchical modes of governance (e.g. negotiation systems, see below) are excluded in this configuration. However, these non-hierarchical modes are embedded in institutional settings with the necessary enforcement capacity to rule authoritatively if need be (*institutional* dimension). In most contemporary cases, trusteeships and foreign occupations are also embedded in an international institutional framework, such as the provisions of International Law or the authorization by the UN Security Council.

Hierarchical steering by external powers requires an extremely asymmetrical distribution of *resources* (material and ideational) in order to be effective. Foreign interveners must commit substantial military capabilities to ensure a monopoly over the means of violence in the governed territory as well as sufficient financial and administrative resources to be able to enforce decisions if need be. They can only compensate for a lack of material resources if their intervention is considered legitimate by those being ruled which then leads to voluntary compliance. Otherwise, the hierarchical enforcement of rules has to be based on brute force and sheer coercion requiring enormous resources to be deployed by the external actors. Most empires learned this the hard way – from the Romans (Esders 2009) to the British and the Soviets – and ultimately collapsed because of a lack of legitimacy in conjunction with overextension (Kennedy 1987).

Quite a few projects in our Research Center explore this type of governance configurations. With regard to colonial rule, Ursula Lehmkuhl and Norbert Finzsch analyze colonial governance and settler imperialism in the British and French colonies in North America and Australia (Lehmkuhl and Finzsch 2009; see also Lehmkuhl 2007; Conrad and Stange 2011). Stefan

Rinke examines security cooperation in border regions of Mexico/U.S. and Argentina/Chile in the late 19th century during the transition from colonial to post-colonial statehood in Latin America (Rinke 2009), while Sebastian Conrad has looked at “scientific colonialism” in the German and Japanese colonies from the late 19th to the early 20th century (Conrad and Stange 2011).

With regard to contemporary trusteeships and foreign military interventions, our projects look at international transitional administrations in Kosovo, Bosnia-Herzegovina, and East-Timor (Ladwig 2009) and at international security governance transfers by UN interim administrations, e.g. in Timor Leste (Schröder 2009b). We also look at the Western-led intervention in Afghanistan (Zürcher 2009; Koehler 2008). A very peculiar case is analyzed by Henrik Enderlein and his team (see their paper to this conference). Creditors of Highly Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC) use courts of consolidated states to enforce debt repayments by HIPC (see also Enderlein, Von Daniels, and Trebesch 2011).

In each of these cases, external actors govern hierarchically and directly interfere with the “Westphalian/Vattelian” sovereignty of states or colonies (Krasner 1999). The host state or colony is still involved, but often sidelined, since it has lost domestic sovereignty. In some cases, such as Timor Leste or Afghanistan, the host state still enjoys international recognition and has entered in a contractual relationship with external actors, thereby “outsourcing” statehood to them (see below).

Our preliminary findings suggest that the external imposition of statehood to colonies, trusteeships, or modern protectorates faces enormous legitimacy problems, both in the home and the “host” countries. As to the contemporary cases, the legitimacy of Western-imposed governance is limited and often gives rise to accusations of paternalism and neo-colonialism, as the U.S. experienced in Iraq (see also Ladwig 2007 for a discussion of the normative problems involved). Our surveys in Afghanistan document that the legitimacy of external governance is very much related to governance output, i.e. the effective delivery of collective goods – from public security to education (Koehler and Zürcher 2007). If these services are not provided, the legitimacy of external actors suffers immediately. In contrast, colonial rule in Latin America was mostly legitimized through input legitimacy, at least temporarily (divine right, traditional authority of the Spanish king etc., see Rinke 2009, 598).

In general, however, externally imposed hierarchical rule is rarely considered legitimate and if so, only as a transitional device. This immediately undermines the efficiency (let alone effectiveness) of these governance configurations, since it requires the interveners to spend enormous material resources to enforce a monopoly over the means of violence and to rule authoritatively. As a result, collective goods such as security are less and less provided which further undermines the legitimacy of external rule.

2. Hierarchical Rule by Non-State Actors: Settler Colonies, Indigenous Chiefs, Warlords, and Companies

The literature on statehood often assumes that the state is the only entity with the ability to rule hierarchically and to exert *Herrschaft* (e.g. Benz 2001; for a discussion see Schuppert 2009). This is not what we find in areas of limited statehood. Rather, our empirical evidence suggests that hierarchical steering by non-state actors is all too common under these conditions. In this sense, we encounter private authority in the strict sense of the word.⁵ This governance configuration shares with the first one that it can rely on hierarchical steering if only to provide a “shadow of hierarchy” to enable other actors to employ non-hierarchical modes of governance.

⁵ Note that the international relations literature often uses the term “private authority” in a rather loose fashion (see e.g. Hall and Biersteker 2002; Cutler, Haufler, and Porter 1999). In our terminology, private authority in the sense of authoritative rule (*Herrschaft*) refers to the ability of non-state actors to steer hierarchically which is rather rare in global governance.

It differs from the provision of statehood by external actors on the *actor* dimension, of course, but also – most importantly – with regard to the *institutional* setting. In many cases – warlords, but also settler imperialism comes to mind - hierarchical rule by non-state actors is far less regulated than state rule giving rise potentially to despotism. In other cases, hierarchical rule by private actors is itself embedded in yet another structure of (hierarchical) authority. Examples include the East India Company or the Hudson Bay Company which exerted control in India and North America on behalf of the British Empire. This is, thus, a case of delegated authority. A different type of institutional embeddedness concerns norms of appropriate behaviour (including respect for human rights, and the like) emanating from transnational communities (Keck and Sikkink 1998) or so-called “traditional” indigenous groups (on functional equivalents for an effective “shadow of hierarchy” see Börzel and Risse 2010).

As to *resources* and power asymmetries, pretty much the same applies for non-state actors as for external state actors in the first configurations. Hierarchical steering involves the use of material and ideational resources. Yet, there is a big difference between the two with regard to legitimacy as a functional equivalent for material power to induce compliance. Our various projects have shown time and again that even the weakest state still enjoys some benefit of the doubt when it comes to legitimacy claims. Non-state actors, however, are rarely considered legitimate when they enforce the rules authoritatively.

Several of our project are studying warlords as hierarchical rulers. In many areas of limited statehood where central authorities are absent, warlords or local “big men” have the ability to enforce the rules and provide security as a public good under certain conditions (Chojnacki 2009; Chojnacki and Branovic 2011; see also Schneekener and Zürcher 2007 for Afghanistan and Pakistan; for the rule of warlords in early 20th century China see Leutner 2009; Leutner 2007).

The same holds true sometimes for companies investing in areas of limited statehood. Extractive industries, for example, not only provide public services under certain circumstances, they even enforce rules hierarchically under certain conditions. Shell in the Niger delta appears to provide an example for such a case (Zimmer 2010). Settler colonies in North America and Australia also ruled hierarchically (Lehmkuhl and Finzsch 2009). So did indigenous chiefs (*caciques gobernadores*) in the Latin American Spanish colonies (Rinke 2009, 599).

As mentioned already, the main problem of this type of configuration is its sustainability in actually providing governance and avoiding despotism. If we assume for a moment that non-state actors such as warlords or companies command the necessary resources to enforce the rules, the real issue is how to induce them to provide collective goods and governance rather than simply exploiting resources and people. In this case, hierarchical steering does not lead to governance, but to racketeering and even more insecurity (for the case of warlords see Chojnacki and Branovic 2011; for extractive industries as part of the problem see Hönke 2010). A quantitative study by Hyeran Jo and Katherine Bryant concerning the compliance of rebel groups and warlords with humanitarian law yields interesting insights in this context (Jo and Bryant forthcoming): The more hierarchical the internal organization of the rebel group and the closer it is to winning and to taking over the state, the more non-state violent actors and warlords are likely to comply with international humanitarian standards. The need for international recognition and legitimacy as well as the requirement to appease the international donor community might explain this finding.

As to indigenous and local rulers, it is probably their embeddedness in local communities and their need to retain some degree of legitimacy which explains the effectiveness of hierarchical governance in these cases and the avoidance of despotism. A case in point is local rule in Somaliland and Puntland, two provinces of the failed state Somalia in which order and security have been maintained rather well over the past fifteen years despite the complete absence of central state authorities (e.g. Menkhaus 2006/2007; Debiel et al. 2010; Renders and Terlinden 2010; see also Chojnacki 2009).

3. Voluntary Delegation of Authority by Host States to Other Actors

In this governance configuration, the host country's state voluntarily gives away its right to steer hierarchical and delegates it to external as well as domestic actors. In other words, host countries give up their "domestic sovereignty" – at least partly – and allow other actors to steer hierarchically on their territory.⁶ Delegated authority constitutes a typical principal – agent relationship, but one with a twist in this case.

As to the *actor* dimension, it is clearly the state which delegates in this case, but those who then do the governing can be domestic and international as well as state and non-state actors. External actors could be other national governments, international consortia, or non-state actors – companies, NGOs – which are still subject to national law. In other cases, states hire foreigners to provide certain services, including security (in the case of Private Military Companies, see Chojnacki 2009; also Avant 2005; Singer 2003; for security governance see Schröder 2009a). Delegation could be extensive in which case the external actor could set policies and its personnel would not be subject to national law, or limited in which case the external actor would be carrying out policies set by the state and its personnel subject to national law. An example of the former would be the Regional Assistance Mission for the Solomon Islands (RAMSI). In the early Middle Ages, the kings of Francia delegated tax, customs, and coinage prerogatives to local non-state actors (Esders 2009). At least some of the UN Transitional Administrations also fall into this category (Ladwig 2009), if they are not cases of outright imposition by external actors. An example of the latter would be the contracting out of customs services, which has taken place in more than thirty countries. An interesting case of delegated authority occurred in Morocco and Jordan: the central state authorities delegated political and administrative powers to local actors such as local committees or communal administrations. These actors then contracted out public services such as water management to tribal communities and public private partnerships (Berber communities in rural Morocco and PPP in the capital of Rabat; see Harders 2009).

With regard to the *modes* of governance, this is a peculiar case. First, delegated authority involves hierarchical relationships insofar as the principal – the host state in this case – commissions governance tasks to an agent or a group of agents. Second, the agents who are supposed to provide public services can do so hierarchically or non-hierarchically.

There is nothing special about this, since this type of outsourcing is well-known in Western consolidated states (Hurrelmann et al. 2008). However, if authority is delegated to private actors in consolidated states, the central authorities still have the ability to exercise their "shadow of hierarchy", i.e. to take back the delegation and to enforce the rules themselves if need be. This ability is lacking under conditions of limited statehood. As a result, weak states delegating authority lack the capacity to enforce the contracts. Otherwise, they would not have outsourced the provision of governance in the first place.

In most cases, delegating authority involves a high degree of *institutionalization*, insofar as it usually relies on formal contracts. Yet, these contracts are rarely enforceable, since the contracting state lacks the *resources* to do so. If governments of areas of limited statehood contract out governance, they do not have the power of enforcement to steer hierarchically or to at least cast a "shadow of hierarchy". It is hierarchy without power to back it up.

As a result, agency slippage is a constant problem in these cases. A typical case in point is the widespread failure of water management in areas of limited statehood. Weak states often outsource water management to private companies as a result of which particularly the urban poor lack reliable access to drinking water in many cases (Beisheim and Liese 2009; Campe and Beisheim 2009). The outsourcing of defense and security to private military and security companies (PMSCs) is another example, affecting states such as Afghanistan as well as external intervenors (such as NATO countries in Afghanistan; see also Chojnacki and

⁶ Strictly speaking and according to international law, protectorates also belong into this category, insofar it involves a "consensual" agreement whereby the dependent state surrenders its domestic sovereignty to a protector. However, the governments of contemporary trusteeships such as Kosovo, Bosnia-Herzegovina, or even Afghanistan are so extraordinarily weak that the act of formal delegation has very little substantive content. I owe this point to Daniel Voelsen.

Branovic 2007; Avant 2005). Agency slippage leads to accountability slippage, e.g. when personnel in these companies commit violations of domestic or international humanitarian law.

In other words, this governance configuration is an interesting case of “hierarchy without (material) resources.” The contract can only be enforced, if the delegating principal – the host state - is considered legitimate by the governance agent. Here, legitimacy as an ideational resource would have to substitute completely for lacking material power. In other cases, e.g. Western development agencies which are authorized by the weak host state to provide governance, the agents are subject to the national laws and accountability rules of their (consolidated) home states who see to it that the contract is fulfilled. Once again, this reminds us that governance in areas of limited statehood is “multi-level governance” in the strict sense of the term.

4. Negotiation Systems

As argued so far, the absence of a strong central state with the capacity to implement and enforce central decisions and the law of the land does not mean the absence of hierarchical modes of governance. However, non-hierarchical governance configurations are the default in areas of limited statehood. Here, we can distinguish at least four types.

In many areas of limited statehood, we observe governance configurations characterized by various combinations of bargaining and arguing/deliberation as is typical for negotiation systems. The main feature of this configuration is that governance is being negotiated here and that no single actor can impose its will on anybody else. In other words, non-hierarchical modes of governance are constitutive for this arrangement.

Other than that, there is huge variation among negotiation systems. As to *actors*, we find empirically the whole range of potential “governors” in areas of limited statehood – state and non-state (companies, NGOs, as well as indigenous actors) on all levels (inter-/transnational, national, local). Our projects look at transnational public private partnerships (PPPs) to implement the UN Millenium goals (Liese and Beisheim 2011; Beisheim, Liese, and Ulbert 2008), at peace negotiations between indigenous foragers (the Cuncáac), rancher, and the postcolonial Mexican state in the mid-19th century (Hölck 2011; Rinke 2009), at bargaining relations between the South African state and multinational corporations with regard to fighting HIV/AIDS and to implementing environmental regulations (Börzel et al. 2011; Börzel, Héritier, and Müller-Debus 2007), at negotiations between external international, national, and local actors to provide security and development services in Northeastern Afghanistan (Zürcher 2009), and to attempt regulating property rights held by indigenous peoples in India and Brazil (Lütz 2009), among others.

As to the *modes of governance* in these configurations, we observe the whole variety of non-hierarchical types of interaction outlined above. Negotiation systems such as formalized PPPs can be viewed as bargaining systems in which actors exchange resources and distribute gains and losses. But they can also be regarded as learning organizations in which actors try to persuade each other about the appropriate rules and means to achieve goals and to provide effective public services (Beisheim, Liese, and Ulbert 2007; Liese and Beisheim 2011). One of our major tasks in the future is to explain under which conditions which mix of arguing and bargaining leads to specific negotiation outcomes. But there is no *prima facie* reason to assume that arguing and persuasion should not matter as non-hierarchical modes of governance under conditions of limited statehood.⁷

The literature on arguing and bargaining has identified various conditions under which we would expect efforts at persuasion and arguing to prevail over incentive-based bargaining, and vice versa (Deitelhoff 2006; Deitelhoff 2009; Risse and Kleine 2010). This literature has shown empirically (e.g. Holzinger 2001a, b) that arguing and reason-giving, on the one hand,

⁷ Cf. also Nicole Deitelhoff’s presentation at the SFB on 11 November 2010.

and bargaining speech acts (threats, promises etc.), on the other hand, mostly occur simultaneously in negotiation systems. This literature has also shown that we do not need to make heroic assumptions about truth-seeking actors in negotiation systems who see themselves in a Habermasian “ideal speech situation.” Rather, research has shifted toward exploring the scope conditions under which we would expect arguing and reason-giving speech acts rather than bargaining speech act to influence the negotiation outcome, and vice versa.

Most of these scope conditions depend on the *institutional* framework of the negotiation system, both formally and informally. But they also depend on the issues at stake and the way in which they are framed:

- The more the institutional rules of the negotiation system privilege and emphasize formal equality among actors (irrespective of underlying power asymmetries), the more we would expect arguing and persuasion to play a role (equality of participants).
- The more the institutional rules privilege organizational roles of arbitration and mediation by neutral actors (often chairpersons of negotiations), the more we would expect arguing and persuasion to matter (leadership roles).
- The more the institutional setup favours transparency of the process and the more the negotiating actors have to legitimize their behaviour in front of diverse constituencies, the more we would expect arguing as a prevailing mode of governance, even behind closed doors (transparency).⁸
- The more (re-) distributive issues are on the table, the more we would expect bargaining modes to prevail (distributive bargains). However, arguing and persuasion is necessary to agree on fairness rules and what constitutes a “fair deal”, and this agreement must be prior to distributive bargains (fairness rules).
- The more the negotiation partners lack “common knowledge” about the state of the world and/or the appropriate norms and rules applying to a given situation, the more we would expect arguing to prevail over bargaining (uncertainty).

Empirically, we are likely to observe that arguing or bargaining matters depending on the various phases of negotiations, i.e. we would expect sequencing in negotiations. This is precisely what could be observed in the peace negotiations between indigenous foragers, ranchers, and the early Mexican republic in 1848-1849 (Hölck 2011). This analysis confirms, for example, the role of mediators and leaders who are trusted by either side. In this case, a Cuncàac woman with close ties to the Mexican Hispanic authorities persuaded the indigenous groups to enter into negotiations in the first place. The negotiations themselves were characterized by sequential moves of arguing and distributive bargaining very similar to what the analytical literature on deliberation suggests.

Our project on transnational public private partnerships (PPP) to implement the UN Millenium Goals also yield some interesting results pertaining to the modes of governance in negotiation systems (Beisheim and Liese 2009; Liese and Beisheim 2011). First, particularly service-delivering PPPs tend to be highly institutionalized in terms of formal rules and regulations and the degree of institutionalization is directly related to the effectiveness of PPPs to deliver services. Moreover, the preliminary findings indicate that PPPs which institutionalize deliberative communication processes and reflexive learning in their process management achieve better results than those which do not.

As to *resources* and power relationships, negotiation systems in areas of limited statehood rarely exhibit a completely symmetrical distribution of material and ideational capacities. Material resources determine to a large degree the bargaining power of the various governance actors. Note that these must not be state actors. Take the case of many public health partnerships in which the resources available to the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation outweigh the financial clout of any other actor by far (Schäferhoff 2011, in preparation). Yet, materially

⁸ The point is not that negotiations should take place in front of a public audience. This often leads to ritualistic arguing behaviour and less efficient outcomes. However, transparency of the process implies that governance actors have to justify their action behind closed doors in front of critical audiences.

underprivileged actors such as (I)NGOs, international organizations, or local “traditional” actors often compensate for their lack of material power by bringing ideational resources to the table ([local] knowledge, moral authority etc.). It then largely depends on the prevailing modes of social coordination and on the institutional rules and procedures of the governance configurations whether ideational resources have a fair chance against materially powerful actors. Formal and institutionalized rules of equality matter insofar in these settings as they establish a logic of appropriateness to level the playing field among actors so that the materially weaker have at least a chance to get heard and to make their points.

In this context, it would be extremely interesting to use the arguing-bargaining literature to investigate so-called “traditional” governance modes of indigenous peoples and local communities (e.g. the dynamics of Loya Jirgas in Afghanistan, see Buchholz 2007).

5. Non-Hierarchical Influence by External Actors

Closely related to negotiation systems are governance configurations by which external actors – mostly foreign countries, development agencies, and international as well as regional organizations – seek influencing local/national actors in areas of limited statehood to provide governance. This configuration differs from negotiation systems in which each actor involved contributes directly to rule-making and to the provision of collective goods, in that external actors provide incentives or try to persuade *others*, namely national and local actors (whether state or non-state) to deliver governance services. The configuration differs from hierarchical steering by external actors (see above) in that the external actors cannot resort to hierarchical steering in this case so that influencing involves strictly non-hierarchical *modes of governance*, whether incentives or sanctions or whether arguing and persuasion. Since the external actors do not directly provide rules or public goods, this configuration is usually linked to other configurations, be it negotiation systems on the ground or be it efforts at hierarchical steering by the domestic state authorities (see conclusions).

As to the *actor dimension*, we observe mostly external state actors in this configuration, be it foreign governments, their development agencies, or international (inter-state) organizations including Regional Organizations (ROs) who try to influence governments in weak states to provide governance. Given that this configuration usually involves non-hierarchical relations between state actors, it is mostly highly *institutionalized* based on international treaties and agreements.

A typical example of this configuration is investigated by Tanja Börzel and her team with regard to the efforts of the European Union (EU) to promote good governance and anti-corruption efforts in the Southern Caucasus (Börzel, Pamuk, and Stahn 2008; for similar efforts with regard to the Southern Mediterranean see Van Hüllen 2010). There is a large literature on EU attempts to externalize internal norms and rules pertaining to how governance should happen in the target country and with what outcome (cf. Lavenex 2004; Lavenex and Schimmelfennig 2009; Börzel and Risse 2009). Through budget support, political dialogue, and conditionality, the EU promotes the adoption of (or at least an approximation to) the *acquis communautaire* and other, broader norms such as democracy and human rights. The EU’s “transformative power” is certainly most pronounced in the context of enlargement, where the EU’s potential to steer hierarchically looms with membership (Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier 2005, Schimmelfennig and Scholtz 2008, Sedelmeier 2006). However, the EU also engages in external governance vis-à-vis its neighbours and more distant countries. It does so through incentives (market access), political conditionality (i.e. the threat of sanctions), but also political dialogue in an effort at persuasion. But the most widely used instrument of the EU actually concerns capacity-building so as to enable weak states in areas of limited statehood to govern hierarchically and to provide good governance. The current project extends this analysis to the governance export of other Regional Organizations such as the OAS, Mercosur, the African Union, ASEAN, and others (Börzel 2009).

A very interesting case in this regard concerns creditor-debtor relations in HIPCs (see paper by Henrik Enderlein et al. for this panel; see also Enderlein, Von Daniels, and Trebesch

2011; Enderlein 2009). This is one of the cases in which private actors try to influence the behaviour of governments in weak states. Here, private creditors invoke courts in consolidated states in order to strengthen their case against HIPCs. However, since foreign courts rarely have enforcement capacity vis-à-vis HIPCs, their “hierarchical” decision serves to ultimately strengthen the bargaining position of creditors versus highly indebted countries. This often results in negotiated settlements – a non-hierarchical mode of governance. The (non-enforcable) hierarchical court decision, thus, is used as a resource in the bargaining relationship between private creditors and HIPCs.

This last example points to the importance of *resources* in this governance configuration. When the EU, for example, deals with Sub-Saharan Africa, the distribution of resources is highly asymmetrical which is likely to increase the EU’s clout over weak states. In other situations, however, the distribution of (material) resources is far more balanced so that external actors cannot simply rely on bargaining to influence governance, but have to employ ideational resources, too. Altogether, though, there is only limited evidence that an asymmetrical distribution of resources between external actors and target states as such translates into the former’s political influence on the latter.

6. Governance by Competition

Negotiation systems and co-regulation refer to efforts by governance actors to explicitly coordinate their behaviour. In contrast, competition systems constitute governance configurations whereby (non-state) actors vie for who can best provide public services in the most efficient and effective ways (for discussions see Benz 2007, Börzel 2010). This type of competition differs from markets in that it directs actors toward contributing to governance in the pursuance of their egoistic interests. A typical example is the so-called “California effect” whereby state regulation (originally with regard to pollution standards in the state of California, see Vogel 1995) induced companies to compete for better regulatory standards in the U.S. as a whole and worldwide. Research with regard to environmental management standards such as ISO 14001 has shown similar effects at work with regard to firms investing in developing countries (Prakash and Potoski 2006, 2007). The African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM) in the framework of the New Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD) constitutes an example of an intergovernmental competition system to institute benchmarking and best practices (very similar to the EU’s Open Mechanism of Coordination [OMC]). The U.S. Millennium Challenge Account (MCA) is another example for an effort to induce states with areas of limited statehood to compete for better governance (Girod, Krasner, and Stoner-Weiss 2009).

The example of the “California effect” demonstrates already that the *institutional* setting in which this governance configuration is embedded, is crucial. Non-state actors such as firms are not “naturally” inclined to compete for the better contribution to governance. They need to be subjected to rules and regulation which induce them to reach or supersede certain benchmarks with regard to human rights or environmental standards. In some cases, these might be state regulations, e.g. home country laws directing multinational corporations “to do no harm” with regard to their investments in areas of limited statehood (Flohr et al. 2010). In this case, governance by competition is embedded in a hierarchical setting. In other cases such as ISO 14001 or the various market-based instruments (such as the Dow Jones Sustainability Index), the institutional arrangement is non-hierarchical.

It follows from the examples mentioned above that competition systems involve state and non-state actors alike, both as those directly contributing to governance (or not) or as those who provide the institutional arrangements in which the competition is embedded. As to the *mode* of governance, competition is non-hierarchical by definition, even though the competition system as such might be regulated by hierarchically imposed rules.

With regard to *resources* and *power*, the resource endowment of actors competing for best practices in governance is crucial, of course. If, e.g., companies are unwilling to or incapable of committing the necessary material resources to provide governance, the competition sys-

tem will fail to accomplish its tasks. Yet, this willingness and/or capacity crucially depends on whether the institutional rules embedding the competition system are either enforceable or whether the embedding institutions can provide enough incentives for the actors to deliver the goods and to compete for best practices. In other words, the most significant question with regard to the efficiency and effectiveness of this governance configuration is whether the embedding institutions have enough material or immaterial resources at their disposal to make the competition system work. Resources are needed to back up hierarchical imposition of the competition rules. But they are even more necessary if the institutional rules cannot be imposed hierarchically. As a result, an asymmetrical relationship between the governance actors competing for the better governance, on the one hand, and those actors who set the rules, on the other hand, is required. Such asymmetries must not rely on material resources alone, however. Normative resources such as legitimacy might do the trick, too. Companies, for example, might be induced to compete for best practices because of naming and shaming including social mobilization. The “California effect” could result from the desire of companies to (re-)gain legitimacy, both in areas of limited statehood and in their (Western) home markets (see Börzel et al. 2011).

7. Parallel Governance

The governance configurations discussed above rely for the most part on the active cooperation and action coordination of the actors involved (except for competition systems which are, however, embedded in strong institutional settings). In other words, these governance configurations are tightly coupled for the most part (Weick 2000). Yet, we often observe empirically configurations of “parallel governance” (for lack of a better word) in which actors try to govern without much cooperation among each other. In many cases of areas of limited statehood, external actors are uncontrolled by the state. While the host government might have formal regulations governing the activities of external actors, it lacks the capacity to enforce its own rules. The “Republic of NGOs” in Haiti is an example of what is all too common in areas of limited statehood (Kristoff and Panarelli 2010). All kinds of “governors” try to provide goods and services, but without much coordination and only loosely coupled. Central state authorities are one actor among many others – local and international, state and non-state - who also govern leading to parallel layers of governance.

To call this configuration “governance” might be a contradiction in terms, insofar as governance by definition involves some degree of interaction coordination among actors. Yet, this is a configuration which is often observable on the ground. As to the *actor* dimension, all potential governance actors might be involved in this configuration. The prevailing “*mode of governance*” might be best described as “non-hierarchical non-cooperation.” In some cases, however, there might be at least some (informal) coordination among actors. Note, however, that the more coordination occurs among governance actors, the more we are dealing with negotiation systems (see above) rather than with “parallel governance.” It also follows that parallel governance is characterized by rather weak institutional rules and embeddedness. Last not least, the *resource endowment* of actors varies considerably.

This is not to say that parallel governance necessarily leads to bad outcomes in terms of inefficient and ineffective governance. The provision of services in areas of limited statehood does not have to rely on tightly coupled organizations. Yet, as the enormous literature on the lack of donor coordination in development aid indicates, the main challenge of parallel governance concerns inefficient performance in delivering services, since lack of coordination might lead to the duplication of services and/or to its total absence in areas where they are most needed.

3. Conclusions

The main part of this paper introduced various governance configuration which we find empirically in areas of limited statehood and which differ according to the actors involved, the

modes of governance, the institutional settings, and the resources and power (a)symmetries among actors. Graph 1 provides a summary of these configurations.

(Graph 1 about here)

In conclusion, I would like to highlight that these configurations usually cannot be found in isolation in areas of limited statehood. Rather, they often co-occur and/or are embedded into each other. This is obvious with regard to the configurations 5 and 6, i.e., external influence on governance and competition systems, respectively. In the former case, external (state) actors try to induce or persuade actors in area of limited statehood to provide governance. In other words, this configuration is usually linked to other arrangements discussed in this paper (e.g. delegated authority and negotiation systems). In the latter case of competition system, the institutional setting providing the rules of competition constitutes part of the configuration, while the competition system itself does the “governing.”

External (state) actors who rule hierarchically in areas of limited statehood through colonial rule, trusteeships, or modern protectorates also enable other governance configurations such as negotiation systems by casting a shadow of hierarchy in many cases. The same holds true for delegated authority by host governments in areas of limited statehood. The agent might not be a single actor – state or non-state -, but a configuration of actors. And so forth.

Yet, it needs to be pointed out that developing a typology of governance configurations can only be a first step toward a theory of governance in areas of limited statehood. The main challenge ahead consists of identifying the scope conditions under which these configurations contribute to both effective and legitimate governance. But then again, we have - hopefully – six more year of research.

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Graph 1: Governance Configurations

<i>Configuration</i>	<i>Actors</i>	<i>Modes of Governance</i>	<i>Institutional Setting</i>	<i>Resources and Power</i>
1. Statehood Provision by External State Actors	Foreign Governments and IOs as principal “governors”	Hierarchical and/or non-hierarchical embedded in “shadow of hierarchy”	Hierarchy (often embedded in International Law); rule-based in the contemporary system	Very asymmetrical to ensure enforcement capacity; Lack of material resources can be compensated by claims to legitimacy
2. Hierarchical Steering by Non-State Actors	Warlords, settlers, companies as principal “governors”	Hierarchical and/or non-hierarchical “in the shadow of hierarchy”	Mostly less regulated giving rise to despotism; Sometimes embedded in external rule structures such as International Law or local institutions	Very asymmetrical to ensure enforcement capacity; Lack of material resources can be compensated by claims to legitimacy
3. Delegated Authority to Other Actors	Host States as Principals, other Actors as Agents	Delegation = hierarchical; governance = hierarchical or non-hierarchical	Usually formally regulated; sometimes embedded in international regulations or domestic law of agent	Delegating State lacks resources to enforce contracts

4. Negotiation Systems	State and Non-State, domestic and international	Non-hierarchical bargaining and arguing/deliberation	Formal and informal; rules often establish formal equality of actors embedded in international and/or domestic institutions	Ranges from rather symmetrical distribution of resources to very asymmetrical arrangements
5. External Influence	Mostly Foreign States, their agencies, and IOs including Regional Organizations	Non-hierarchical: incentives and sanctions, but also arguing and persuasion; capacity-building Linked to other governance configurations on the ground	Mostly strongly institutionalized through inter-state treaties and agreements	Asymmetrical distribution of resources (incl legitimacy) in favor of external actors necessary condition for effectiveness In cases of symmetrical distribution, external influence rather limited
6. Competition Systems	State and Non-State Actors, Domestic and International	Competition system: non-hierarchical Institutional Rules setting up competition: hierarchical or non-hierarchical	Effectiveness depends crucially on the institutional setting in which it is embedded	Institution regulating competition requires material or ideational resources inducing competition to produce governance
7. Parallel Governance	State and non-state, domestic and international	Non-hierarchical non-cooperation (lack of) coordination among governance actors	Absence of or weak institutions	Resource endowment of actors varies